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ABSTRACT
Across domains, organizations and society are facing a trust deficit (Twenge, Campbell,
& Carter, 2014). This is problematic, as trust is important to a variety of critical organizational
outcomes, such as perceived task performance, team satisfaction, relationship commitment, and
stress mitigation (Costa, Roe, & Taillieu, 2001), and has been cited as a motivator for
cooperation and knowledge transfer due to its capacity to reduce fear and risk of exploitation
(Chen et al., 1998; Fleig-Palmer & Schoorman, 2011; Irwin & Berigan, 2013; Yamagishi &
Sato, 1986), and a key component of collaboration. As organizations increasingly rely upon
collaboration for achieving important outcomes, it is of critical importance that organizations
understand how to not only develop interpersonal trust in collaborative partnerships to facilitate
these positive outcomes, but also the way in which interpersonal trust is broken and can be
repaired when problems inevitably arise. Though research has begun to investigate trust violation
and trust repair, relatively little is known about trust development, violation, and repair as a
process that unfolds over time. This is problematic, as cross-sectional studies fail to capture
change, both in terms of how trust itself changes as well as how the effect of a violation or the
utility of a repair strategy may be weaker or stronger in the long-term than the short-term. Thus,
findings from a single point in time may result in different conclusions and recommendations
than those that would result from long-term investigation.
Therefore, this study examines how interpersonal trust patterns unfold within individuals,
and how these patterns differ between individuals depending on the type of violation and the
repair strategy employed. An experimental study using discontinuous growth modeling to
examine intraindividual and interindividual differences in trust processes found that generally,
iii

trust was negatively impacted more after an intentional (“will do”) violation as compared to a
competence (“can do”) violation, such that it had a greater impact on character assessments than
a competence violation and also damaged perceptions of ability as much as a competence
violation. These negative impacts carried over into trust restoration, which was significantly
slower after an intentional violation than a competence violation. Furthermore, study findings
suggest that after an intentional violation, trust restored more quickly when surveillance was
implemented than when compensation was offered. Though the opposite did not hold true for a
competence violation, the findings did approach significance. Drawing from these findings,
implications and future research recommendations are discussed.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
Across domains, organizations and society are facing a trust deficit. A recent 30-year
study investigating trust and social capital from 1972 to 2012 found that in the United States,
interpersonal trust and trust in institutions such as the media, government, and health
organizations has reached historic lows (Twenge et al., 2014). Other polls have reflected similar
themes; in terms of the economy, business leaders were trusted less than politicians
(CNN/Opinion Research Corporation, 2009) and only 39% of employees trust senior leaders
(Watson Wyatt, 2007). These trends are highly problematic for organizations. Trust is important
to a variety of critical organizational outcomes, such as perceived task performance, team
satisfaction, relationship commitment, stress mitigation (Costa et al., 2001), knowledge transfer
in mentoring relationships (Fleig-Palmer & Schoorman, 2011), and cooperation, due to its
capacity to reduce fear and risk of exploitation (Chen et al., 1998; Irwin & Berigan, 2013;
Yamagishi & Sato, 1986).
Indeed, in their theoretical framework, Bedwell and colleagues (2012) cited interpersonal
trust as a key collaborative process that affects overall collaborative performance. Collaboration,
defined as “an evolving process whereby two or more social entities actively and reciprocally
engage in joint activities aimed at achieving at least one shared goal” (note: emphasis added;
Bedwell et al., 2012), is influenced by not only characteristics of the entities themselves but also
external forces such as environmental characteristics (e.g., level of risk and uncertainty;
stressors, such as performance failure or ethical issues) and temporal characteristics (e.g.,
relationship tenure or phase). As organizations increasingly rely upon collaboration
1

(Tannenbaum, Mathieu, Salas, & Cohen, 2012), it is thus of critical importance that
organizations understand not only how to develop interpersonal trust in interpersonal
collaborative partnerships in order to facilitate these positive outcomes, but also the way in
which interpersonal trust is broken and can be repaired when problems inevitably arise.
Trust deficits can exist for a variety of reasons, including dispositional tendencies to trust
(or distrust), the social environment in which individuals operate, and as a response to violations
(i.e., events that damage trust; Fulmer & Gelfand, 2013). For instance, Robinson and Rousseau
(1994) found that 55% of employees reported that their employers had violated their
psychological contract (i.e., failed to adequately fulfill the promises made), which reduced trust.
This is troubling, as trust violations (i.e., events that damage trust) can have a substantial impact
on relationships and outcomes (Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009), leading to relationship withdrawal
or revenge (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2006), reduced affective commitment, and higher turnover
intentions (Dulac, Coyle-Shapiro, Henderson, & Wayne, 2008), among other negative outcomes.
However, there are different ways that trust can be broken, including through accidental (due to a
lack of competence, or ability) versus intentional acts, and it is certainly reasonable to consider
that the type, or characteristics, of a violation may make it more or less damaging to
collaborative relationships. Indeed, studies have found that the severity (large versus small),
frequency (single versus multiple), and timing (early versus late in the relationship) are important
factors (Kramer & Lewicki, 2010), but to my knowledge the relative immediate and long-term
effects of different types of violations has not been empirically examined. This is problematic, as
expectations for repair cannot be fully understood without understanding the way in which trust
was broken and the extent of the damage done.
2

Fortunately, there is hope for avoiding negative outcomes of trust deficits, namely
through efforts to restore trust after a violation. Encouragingly, research suggests that a variety of
strategies are useful for restoring broken trust, and several of these studies have gone a step
further to investigate the utility of different strategies in repairing trust after particular types of
violation events. For instance, research findings suggest that it is better to apologize and accept
blame when the damaging event was a mistake, but to deny responsibility if it was intentional
(Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004). Much of the literature to date has focused on verbal
strategies that repair perceptions of the trustee’s trustworthiness (i.e., a perceived trait that makes
one worthy of taking a risk on), such as the effects of apology (i.e., expressive vocal acts
indicating empathy or acceptance of responsibility), accounts (i.e., explanations of the violation
and why it occurred; Beugré, 2011), and denial of accountability for a violation (e.g., Kim,
Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004; Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006; Struthers, Eaton, Santelli,
Uchiyama, & Shirvani, 2008). These strategies are particularly useful in shaping attributions of
blame, trustworthiness, and guilt.
Other potentially useful non-verbal repair strategies that draw from alternative theoretical
perspectives (Dirks, Lewicki, & Zaheer, 2009) have been proposed but not yet fully examined to
determine their effectiveness (Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007). In particular, Dirks and
colleagues (2009) suggest that social equilibrium (i.e., efforts to restore stability and reinforce
norms in relationships) and structural (i.e., the use of regulations or measures that provide
assurance of positive exchange) strategies are also particularly useful in repairing relationships
beyond just changing perceptions of the offender. Indeed, verbal strategies may not always be
practical or possible depending on the situation, and the use of non-verbal tactics such as
3

compensation (i.e., tangible amends to make up for harm done) or surveillance (i.e., monitoring
systems that provide assurance of positive exchange and prevent future transgressions) may be
more appropriate. However, there is much to learn in order to provide scientifically-based
recommendations to organizations regarding the use of these non-verbal methods.
As a key component of collaboration, trust is a reciprocal process that evolves over time.
Despite this, work to date has not examined trust as a temporal process, meaning there is much to
learn about the short- and long-term impact of the different ways that trust is broken and repaired
and how trust changes, or unfolds (Fulmer & Gelfand, 2013; Schoorman et al., 2007). Studies on
trust violation and repair have overwhelmingly utilized cross-sectional designs, meaning they
only compare people at a single point in time (Dirks et al., 2009; Lewicki, Tomlinson, &
Gillespie, 2006). This is problematic, as it fails to capture change, both in terms of how trust
itself changes as well as how useful a repair strategy is in the immediate versus long-term. Thus,
findings from a single point in time may result in different conclusions and recommendations
than those that would result from long-term investigation. Though the findings from previous
studies have been enlightening in terms of beginning to understand trust repair, there is much
that can be gained from examining the process of trust as well as how time factors into the
effects of violation and repair efforts on trust. To my knowledge, only one empirical study has
investigated trust trajectories, or patterns over time (i.e., Fulmer, 2010), but this study did not
investigate the immediate or long-term relative impact of different types of violations.
Purpose of the Current Study
The current study’s purpose is to serve as an initial step toward addressing these gaps, by
investigating trust as a key collaborative process that is influenced jointly by the parties
4

involved, evolves over time, and is influenced by trust violations and repair strategies. Simply
stated, this study makes three important contributions toward understanding how trust changes
over time, how trust repairs depending on what broke the relationship, and how quickly trust can
be repaired. The specific aims are threefold.
First, this study takes a process approach to investigate interpersonal trust in collaborative
relationships as a phenomenon that unfolds over time. Historically, research on interpersonal
trust violation and repair has examined trust at a single point in time using between-subjects
designs, leaving much to be explored in terms of how it grows, is damaged, and restores.
Therefore, this study examines trust both within- and between-subjects to investigate
interpersonal trust patterns that unfold within individuals in collaborative relationships as they
progress through the phases of initial trust development, trust dissolution (i.e., trust decreasing
after a violation), and trust restoration (i.e., trust growing again after it has been damaged). In
particular, this study examines (1) how trust is developed, (2) the degree to which trust is broken
after different types of violations as well as their long-term impact on trust, and (3) the utility of
two different trust repair efforts in restoring trust.
Second, this study leverages the process approach to understand the relative effects of
competence (i.e., accidental, suggesting lack of ability) and intentional (i.e., deliberate or
purposeful, suggesting lack of integrity) violations on the dissolution (i.e., reduction) in
interpersonal trust. More specifically, this study examines (1) relative differences in the
immediate impact of a competence versus intentional trust violation, as well as (2) the relative
long-term effects of these violations on the rate at which trust can be restored.

5

Third, this study builds upon the extant work on trust violation and trust repair to go
beyond attributional perspectives and the use of verbal tactics to also draw from alternative
theories (i.e., social equilibrium and structural) and focus on two non-verbal strategies,
compensation and surveillance. Though commonly used in collaborative relationships, these
non-verbal strategies are relatively under-studied in terms of their actual effectiveness in
restoring trust after a transgression, more specifically after competence- versus intentional
violations have occurred.
Overall, this research is designed to make several important contributions. First, this
study takes a process rather than a cross-sectional approach to provide a foundation for
understanding trust as a process of trust development, dissolution, and restoration that occurs
within individuals. This approach is an important step toward understanding not just how much
trust one has at a given time, but the speed, or rate, at which it changes, thereby allowing for
projections of future trust as well. Second, this research examines both the immediate and longterm impact of competence and intentional violations as distinct types of events. Though
violations are assumed to have a detrimental impact on trust overall, it’s also important to know
what causes trust to break down the most and whether these events have a lasting effect or if the
relationship is able to quickly rebound. Finally, this research provides empirical evidence for the
utility of two under-studied methods of repairing trust over time. This is an important next step
in moving beyond verbal tactics (e.g., apology, accounts, denial) to understand if there are nonverbal behavioral or environmental methods that can be used if one is unable or unwilling to
engage in conversation or would prefer to repair the relationship through less personal means.
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Taken together, this study has important implications for how trust development, dissolution, and
repair are approached in interpersonal collaborative contexts.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
Interpersonal Trust
Trust, defined as the confident, positive expectations about the words, actions, and
decisions of another in situations entailing risk (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; McAllister, 1995),
has been conceptualized in many different ways. However, there are clearly similarities across
definitions, as many have theorized that it consists of two distinct facets. First, Barber (1983) and
Sitkin and Roth (1993) identified trust in competence, or ability, and trust in motives or values as
the two components of trust. Similarly, McAllister (1995) argued the two primary trust facets
include cognition-based and affect-based trust. Cognition-based trust is defined as a confidence
in a one’s history of behavior and reputation for dependability, reliability, or predictability. In
other words, trust is developed as a result of cognitive reasoning. In contrast, affect-based trust is
defined as a confidence based on emotional investments and reciprocal care and concern for the
other party’s well-being. Thus, emotional ties link individuals and this serves as the foundation
of trusting expectations. From the trust violation literature, Elangovan, Auer-Rizzi, and Szabo
(2007) suggested that violations can be classified into two distinct types: “couldn’t” and “didn’t
want to,” or competence and integrity, respectively (Janowicz-Panjaitan & Noorderhaven, 2009;
Kim et al., 2004). Competence violations are situations in which the trustee unintentionally
engages in an act that reflects a lack of ability (e.g., a mistake), whereas integrity violations
occur when the trustee intentionally engages in an act that violates expectations to engage in an
ethical and fair manner. In the context of interpersonal relationships within organizations, the
distinction between competence (predictability of performance) and intent (purposeful behavior
based on motives/values) essentially represents the task-focused and person-focused components
8

of a working relationship, a distinction that has been made for other interpersonally-grounded
constructs such as cohesion (i.e., task cohesion, social cohesion; Carless & de Paola, 2000),
interpersonal citizenship behaviors (i.e., task-focused, person-focused; Settoon & Mossholder,
2002), conflict (i.e., task conflict, relationship conflict; Jehn, 1995, 1997), team performance
(i.e., taskwork, teamwork; Morgan, Glickman, Woodward, Blaiwes, & Salas, 1986), and
psychological contracts (i.e., relational, transactional; (Robinson & Rousseau, 1994; Rousseau,
1995).
Trust as a Process: Development, Dissolution, and Repair
Beyond understanding the meaning and structure, or types, of trust, it is also important to
consider that like other attitudinal constructs, trust is inherently dynamic. Within-person
fluctuations are expected as trust changes over time – as the relationship between the trustor and
trustee develops and evolves, and as events occur that shock the underlying affect (Judge, Hulin,
& Dalal, 2010). Indeed, Affective Events Theory (AET; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) suggests
that work events evoke an emotional reaction, which in turn shapes immediate responses as well
as long-term thoughts and actions. In other words, events may be short-lived but may have a
long-term influence on attitudes and behaviors.
Prior research has identified three trust phases: trust development (or formation), trust
dissolution, and trust restoration (e.g., Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2009; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, &
Camerer, 1998). As suggested in Figure 1, trust is generally assumed to increase or grow during
trust development, to decrease or dissolve after a violation, and to begin growing or restoring
again at some point after the violation (e.g., after effort has been made to repair the damage
done). Drawing from a framework offered by Dirks, Lewicki, and Zaheer (2009) for
9

understanding relationship repair as a process, several questions about how trust unfolds arise,
including the factors that influence trust; the evolution of trust as it moves through processes of
development, dissolution, and restoration; and outcomes of trust processes. More specifically,
what factors of the person or situation influence how trust unfolds over time? What is the state of
trust and is it growing? What caused trust to decrease, and to what extent and how quickly is it
damaged? What actions were taken to repair trust, and to what extent and how quickly is it
restored? And what factors are impacted by trust as it unfolds over time?

Figure 1. Trust development, dissolution, and restoration over time.
Several factors come into play to facilitate changes in trust, including characteristics of
the trustor and the trustee, the past relationship between the parties (e.g., patterns of successful
cooperation), communication processes (e.g., threats, promises), relationship form (e.g., friend,
authority, partner), and structural parameters governing the relationship (Lewicki et al., 2006).
Characteristics of the trustor (i.e., the person doing the trusting) include individual differences
10

such as propensity to trust (i.e., a general willingness to trust others; Mayer, Davis, &
Schoorman, 1995), whereas characteristics of the trustee (i.e., the one being trusted) determine
trustworthiness. Trust is related yet conceptually distinct from trustworthiness. Whereas trust
represents an internal cognition or feeling, trustworthiness is a perceived attribute of another
party. In one of the most well-known models of trust development, Mayer and colleagues (1995)
suggested that trustworthiness is based on expectations of one’s ability, benevolence (i.e.,
perception that the other party is well-intentioned and motivated to act in a way that is beneficial
to the trustor, due to an attachment or loyalty based on care and concern), or integrity (i.e.,
perception that the trustee adheres to a set of norms or values that the trustor finds acceptable).
Though the trustor may trust because they perceive the trustee to be trustworthy, one can also
trust for various external reasons, such as situational norms or other structural parameters that
reduce uncertainty and risk regardless of the innate characteristics of the other individuals
involved (Chen et al., 1998).
Trust Development
Trust development, or formation, describes the way in which individuals come to trust
one another and how that trust increases over time as the relationship develops. In an
examination of the trust development literature, two dominant theories of trust development
emerged, namely transformational models and swift trust.
First, early transformational models of trust development assumed that at the beginning
of a relationship, trust was low or even nonexistent (Lewicki et al., 2006). For instance, Shapiro,
Sheppard, and Cheraskin (1992) and Lewicki and Bunker (1995) posited that trust develops
through three phases: deterrence-based or calculus-based trust (respectively; i.e., short-term
11

advantages of acting in a distrustful way are outweighed by the cost of retribution or severing the
relationship), knowledge-based trust (i.e., knowing one sufficiently well enough to be able to
predict one’s behavior), and finally, identification-based trust (i.e., identifying with the other’s
desires such that partners can act on each other’s behalf). Similarly, Rousseau and colleagues
(1998) suggested that early trust is derived from the existence of deterrence mechanisms coupled
with knowledge about one’s partner (i.e., calculus-based trust) and over time and through
repeated interactions, emotion enters the relationship and relational trust develops. These
theories suggest that time and multiple interactions are required for trust to grow and develop in
order to reach full relationship potential.
On the other hand, the concept of swift trust has also received some attention, particularly
in explaining how temporary groups or temporary systems appear to be tied together by trust,
despite the fact that traditional sources of trust (e.g., familiarity, threats and deterrents, prior
interactions) are not present. Swift trust refers to a unique form of perception and relating that
relies upon categorization of the trustee into a group from which the trustor can infer information
(about trustworthiness) in order to manage risk, uncertainty, expectations, and vulnerability
(Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996). Swift trust is assumed to be role-based and derived from
knowledge of professional standards such as training and development; recruitment from a small
labor pool with good reputation; and moderate levels of interdependence. For instance, medical
teams are often quick to form to address the needs of a patient and in many cases have never
worked together before. However, the physicians involved may have a high level of trust in one
another despite not having personally interacted in the past. According to Wildman and
colleagues (2012), as trustors in these swift starting teams make trust-related evaluations of the
12

trustee, they draw primarily from (1) their own propensity to trust, (2) surface level cues, and (3)
information imported from past experience or third parties. Thus, theories of swift trust suggest
that individuals draw from available information to thus enter a relationship with high levels of
trust, and that high level of trust is assumed to persist barring evidence that suggests it is not
warranted.
Taken together, these competing theories are at odds with one another, and yet, relatively
little work has empirically examined swift trust, transformational trust over time, and how these
processes interact over time. To advance theory on trust development, I thus use these competing
predictions to conduct strong inference tests (Platt, 1964) and pit alternative theories against one
another. As noted by Dalal, Bhave, and Fiset (2014), comparing theories of within-person
variability supports the elaboration of theory to improve precision and scope. Whereas
transformational theories of trust suggest that trust starts low and develops over time through
interactions, theories of swift trust suggest that individuals can enter into an interaction with a
high level of trust by drawing on environmental cues, personal assumptions, and past
experiences in similar situations. As such, it’s unclear whether trust will transform or will
develop over time in collaborative interpersonal relationships. If transformational models are the
best explanation of how trust develops in interpersonal collaborative relationships, we would
expect that initial trust would be low and not significantly different from zero, but would grow
and change with time. If swift trust is instead the best explanation of trust development, we
would expect that initial trust would be high and significantly different from zero, but would not
change significantly until a disconfirming event (e.g., a trust violation) warranted a drop in trust.
Therefore, the following competing hypotheses are put forth:
13

Hypothesis 1: In collaborative interpersonal contexts, (a) initial trust (i.e., intercept) will
be low and not significantly different from zero but change in trust development (i.e.,
slope) will be positive and significant (transformational theories), or (b) initial trust (i.e.,
intercept) will be high and significantly different from zero but change in trust
development (i.e., slope) will be nonsignificant (swift trust).
Trust Dissolution
The majority of trust research has focused on the structure of trust, how it develops, and
how it affects various organizationally-relevant outcomes (Schoorman et al., 2007). Only
recently has research begun to focus on how trust violations, defined as a transgression that
damages one’s expectations of another’s competence or intent, impact trust. However,
understanding the impact of trust violations is critical for understanding how to best restore trust
when they do occur.
Social exchange theory (Blau, 1964;Gouldner, 1960) and psychological contract theory
(Rousseau, 1995) provide an explanation for why violations affect trust. Social exchange
relationships are subjective, relationship-oriented interactions that are characterized by the
exchange of socio-emotional benefits, mutual trust and commitment, long-term focus, and openended commitments (Lavelle, Rupp, & Brockner, 2007). Social exchange theory is rooted in the
concept of exchange norms and thus, expectations. In particular, individuals have general
expectations for exchange that serve as a stabilizing function in groups and are rooted in societal
norms, as well as specific expectations that a particular exchange partner will conform to
accepted norms and provide rewards for association. Furthermore, both social exchange theory
and psychological contract theory suggest that exchanges and contracts can be either economic
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or social in nature. Trust is also based upon expectations of behavior that are rooted in norms of
conduct. In particular, trust expectations are developed through the fulfillment of exchange
norms and thus, maintenance of psychological contracts among the trustor and trustee
(Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005).
Violation Type. Trust is based on what is put into and received from a relationship,
economic and relational. Therefore, an imbalance in exchange results in dissatisfaction and
decreased trust (Ambrose & Schminke, 2003; Aryee, Budhwar, & Chen, 2002; Khazanchi &
Masterson, 2011). In a study examining whether trust served as an exchange deepener or
uncertainty reducer in the relationship between organizational justice and performance, Colquitt,
Lepine, Piccolo, Zapata, and Rich (2012) found that affect-based trust (i.e., intent) resulted in
normative commitment whereas cognition-based trust (i.e., competence) reduced uncertainty.
They concluded that trust based in a sense of caring and investment serves to deepen exchange
norms whereas cognition-based trust reduces uncertainty in a partner’s behavior. As competencebased trust is concerned with one’s ability to perform a task, it can be formed through continual
display of successful completion of tasks and broken by mistakes. Intent-based trust focuses on
the intentions or objective of the other party, including their character or motives, thus allowing
it to build through consistent displays of care and concern or well-intentioned behaviors, and
damaged through betrayal (Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006). Thus, competence- and
intent-based violations signal a breach of the contract and norms for reciprocal exchange (the
basis of expectations), and ultimately damage trust and trust-related behaviors (AET; Weiss &
Cropanzano, 1996). Hence, after violations, trust enters a trust dissolution phase.
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However, there is reason to believe that trust will be impacted differently depending on
the type of violation. Attribution theory suggests that when evaluating trust, trustors first assess
the locus of causality, or whether the violation is due to internal characteristics of the trustee or
to external forces (Weiner, 1986). In particular, competence-based violations are generally
considered to be out of the violator’s volitional control (Weiner, 1986, 2001) and are generally
evaluated at a more specific level (i.e., an individual can lack competence in one ability but be
proficient in another). However, integrity and benevolence are generally perceived as a stable
indicator that an individual is (un)trustworthy, such that if they lack integrity in one situation
then that can be generalized across situations.
Following along this line of reasoning, when causality is attributed to dispositional bases
(i.e., integrity) there is potential for spillover effects from intentional violations, such that trust in
one’s competence will be damaged even if the violation was one of intent. In other words,
intentional violations may be so generalized that they also impact assessments of competence.
For example, when individuals hold different political views from one another and use those
views to engage in behaviors deemed unethical (thereby committing an intent-based violation),
the trustee may not only lose trust the ethics or benevolence of the individual, but also attribute
their alternative beliefs, values, and/or behaviors to a lack of intelligence (thus damaging
competence-based trust). Therefore, I suggest that,
Hypothesis 2: Trust will dissolve significantly faster (i.e., a more negative slope) after an
intentional violation than a competence violation.
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Trust Restoration
Trust repair is defined as “those activities in which party 2 (the trustee) has taken
advantage of the party 1’s (the trustor) vulnerability and seeks to restore the willingness of that
party to be vulnerable in the future” (Kramer & Lewicki, 2010). Though repair and restoration
are often used interchangeably within the literature, recent work argues that these terms may not
be synonymous, as restoration implies trust is returned to previous levels and past violations are
fully forgiven and forgotten. Conversely, trust repair implies that the relationship may be
mended but the past cannot be erased, much like a broken vase that has been glued back
together. It is worth noting, however, that though I use the term “trust restoration” here, it is
simply because the term “trust repair” implies that a tangible, motivated action has been taken to
correct the relationship. Trust can be restored after a violation through other, third party (i.e.,
structural) means or through repeated displays of predictable, positive behavior, without any
forthright attempts to correct the issue.
Violation Type. Following a similar line of reasoning as offered for Hypothesis 2, given
the inherent meaning attributed to an intentional violation as compared to one of competence, it
is also expected that in addition to intentional violations having a more dramatic negative impact
on trust, trust may also be more difficult to restore after an intentional violation than a
competence violation. The conflict literature suggests that conflict arises as a result of perceived
deprivation of resources or acceptable treatment because of the actions (or inactions) of another
(see Salas, Shuffler, Thayer, Bedwell, & Lazzara, 2014, for brief review). This conflict can be
either task-focused, reflecting problems surrounding the execution of tasks, or relationshipfocused, reflecting interpersonal problems that result in tension among individuals. Empirical
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and meta-analytic evidence suggests that relationship conflict is particularly detrimental to
collaborative functioning and performance outcomes (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003; Shaw et al.,
2011). Indeed, in a recent study examining downward trust spirals in small groups, Ferguson and
Peterson (2015) found that reduced trust fueled relationship conflict, which in turn lowered
intragroup trust even further over time. Importantly, this is not to say that trust cannot be restored
after an intentional violation. However, because intentional violations are more affect-laden (i.e.,
more likely to incite deep emotional responses) and more generalizable across situations, it is
expected that the negative emotion and friction will make it more difficult for individuals to
assume risk and expect positive behaviors and outcomes from their partners. Instead, it is
expected that the trustor will be wary of an individual’s intentions following this type of
violation. Therefore, a greater number of positive interactions over a longer period of time will
be required to restore trust after an intentional violation than after a competence violation, which
lacks the negative feelings of betrayal and the enduring attributions of character/integrity flaws
and thus is expected to be restored more quickly and easily. Therefore, I hypothesize that,
Hypothesis 3: Trust will restore significantly slower (i.e., a less positive slope) after an
intentional violation than a competence violation.
Repair Strategy. Though trust can be broken and may take more or less time to restore
depending on the circumstances, there is evidence supporting the use of repair strategies for
restoring trust. Recent reviews of the literature on trust development and repair have noted that to
date, the quantitative empirical work on trust repair has largely focused on (1) the effects of
verbal tactics such as apology (i.e., expressive vocal acts), accounts (i.e., excuses), and denial of
accountability for the violation (Fulmer & Gelfand, 2013; Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2009; Kramer
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& Lewicki, 2010; Schoorman et al., 2007), and (2) the extent to which repair strategies are more
or less effective in repairing trust depending on the type of violation. The extant research
supports the idea that specific repair efforts may be more or less effective depending on whether
the violation was one of competence or intent. Kim, Dirks, Cooper, and Ferrin (2006) concluded
that internal apologies (i.e., apologies that express regret and accept responsibility) were more
effective in repairing trust after a competence violation, whereas external apologies (i.e.,
apologies that attribute the violation to some external party or event, such as accounts) were
better for repairing trust after integrity violations. Similarly, Bakker, Leenders, Gabbay, Kratzer,
and Engelen (2006) found that apologies were more successful in repairing competence-based
trust and denial more effective in repairing integrity-based trust. Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, and Dirks
(2007) found similar results; specifically, apologies were more effective in repairing
competence-based trust and denial better for integrity-based trust repair. On the surface, it seems
counterintuitive that providing an explanation or excuse, or denying a violation altogether would
be useful in repairing trust. One explanation for these findings is that accounts are helpful in
mitigating a negative understanding of an individual’s motives or intentions (Bies, 1987); in
other words, the violated party may be led to believe that the violator had no other choice, given
the circumstances. In fact, accounts have even been cited as effective in influencing procedural
fairness perceptions (Bies & Shapiro, 1988).
Dirks and colleagues (2009) provided an integrated summary of the relationship repair
literature and suggested that there are three dominant approaches, or processes, for relationship
repair: (1) attributional (i.e., repair provides information to offset negative inferences about
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violator), (2) social equilibrium (i.e, repair restores relative standing of parties and reaffirms
norms), and (3) structural (i.e., repair discourages/prevents future violations).
The first, attributional processes, has arguably been the most predominantly studied
perspective in the trust literature. The attributional perspective suggests that trust is developed,
violated, and restored through intra-individual cognitive processes regarding the extent to which
behaviors are caused by the trustee or some external force (locus of causality), controllable, and
stable (likely to occur again) (Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009; Weiner, 1986). The assumption is that
individual differences are the primary determinant of behavior and thus, trustors are motivated to
attribute behaviors to dispositional causes and trustees are motivated to shape those attributions
(as being internal to themselves or due to external factors). Therefore, tactics such as social
accounts, apologies, denial, or even compensation can be employed in an effort to convince the
trustor that violations are due to external forces (i.e., something completely out of the violator’s
control) or are not likely to occur again in the future.
The second approach assumes that trust is a function of social equilibrium, such that
equilibrium, or harmony, within the relationship should be developed and maintained. However,
violations threaten this homeostasis and therefore, efforts must be made to repair the
relationship. Trustees, thus, are motivated to engage in social rituals that restore equilibrium,
such as providing an apology, offering compensation, or undergoing punishment. However, the
key here is that the relationship between two individuals must be placed back into balance, rather
than a cognitive assessment of whether the violation was in the violator’s control and will occur
again.
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Finally, structural processes can also shape trust and exchange relationships. Here, the
emphasis is on contextual factors that promote exchange. This perspective assumes that
individuals are motivated to engage in exchange if it is profitable to do so and thus, structures
provide credible assurance that individuals will adhere to exchange norms and future violations
will be prevented or discouraged. Thus, unlike attributional and social equilibrium tactics that are
implemented by the trustee, structural solutions include contextual motivators or deterrents such
as incentives, monitoring or surveillance, regulation, policies and procedures, or other social
norms.
Most of the literature has followed the attributional approach to investigate ways to repair
negative inferences about the violator (such as apology, accounts). However, social equilibrium
and structural approaches may have as much (or more) utility in restoring trust. Thus, to extend
upon this work I examine the utility of compensation and surveillance in repairing relationships
after violation events. A summary of relevant literature discussed below is provided in Table 1.
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Table 1. Summary of trust restoration literature relevant to study hypotheses.

Article

Study Type

Beugré (2011)

Historiometric
content
analysis

De Cremer (2010)

De Cremer, van
Dijk, & M Pilluda
(2010)
Desmet, De
Cremer, & van
Dijk, 2010)
Desmet, De
Cremer, & van
Dijk (2011a)
Desmet, De
Cremer, & van
Dijk (2011b)

Experimental

2 experimental
studies

Experimental

Experimental

4 experimental
studies

Participant
Type
American
Airlines union
negotiations
(event)

Key Findings
Social accounts (e.g., apology, justification, admission of
wrong-doing) necessary but not sufficient to repair justice;
instead, concrete actions are required (e.g., removal of
offender).
When losses were allocated, violated parties are more likely to
engage in trusting behavior when the violator has responded
Undergraduate with compensation, whereas apologies were more effective
students
when gains were allocated.
Recipients of an unfair offer had a stronger desire to receive
social information addressing the issue when they were
uncertain if the allocating party knew the exact value of the
resources.
When receipients were uncertain if the allocating party knew
Undergraduate the exact value of the resources, denial led to lower judgments
students
of trustworthiness than when an apology was offered.
Larger compensation resulted in higher trust when the
University
transgressor provided it voluntarily, but compensation size had
students
no effect when the compensation was forced by a third party.
Voluntary compensation from a transgressor communicated
University
repentence more when it was voluntary than forced,
students
particularly for those with a low propensity to forgive.
The extent to which larger compensation elicited more trust
depends on how clear the transgressor's intention to violate
University
was, such that compensation was useful but attributions of bad
students
intent moderated the effect of compensation size.
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Relevance

Apology, Accounts,
Structural

Apology,
Compensation

Denial, apology

Compensation

Compensation

Compensation

Article

Study Type

Desmet &
Leunissen (2014)

Experimental

Dirks, Kim,
Ferrin, & Cooper
(2011)
Elangovan, AuerRizzi, & Szabo
(2015)

Ferrin, Kim,
Cooper, & Dirks
(2007)
Haesevoets,
Folmer, De
Cremer, & Van
Hiel (2013)

4 experimental
studies

Experimental

Two
experimental
studies

Experimental

Participant
Type

Key Findings
Transgressors are willing to provide less compensation to a
Study 1:
victim who believes the transgression was intentional, but only
Mturk
when there was no shared future interaction. When future
Study 2:
interactions are imminent, transgressors' compensation is not
Undergraduate impacted by intentionality feedback
Penance (i.e., offer to pay) and regulation (i.e., system to
assure future trustworthy behavior), two substantive/tangible
trust repair strategies, can be effective in restoring trust to the
extent that they are perceived as repentence (i.e., violator is
regretful and committed to reform)
Trustors saw signals of repentance as more informative when
Undergraduate violation was in competence than integrity
students in
Despite the surface-level differences, substantive responses
Singapore
were comparable with apology (a non-substantive response).
Middle to
Trust eroded regardless of the damage caused. However, repair
senior level
lessened trust erosion compared to no repair, particularly when
managers
the trustee engaged in increasing levels of repair behavior.
Study 1:
Graduate
business
students in US
Study 2:
Undergraduate Reticence is a suboptimal response to an integrity violation
business
because, like apology, it fails to address guilt. And reticence is
students in
a suboptimal response to a competence violation because, like
Singapore
denial, it fails to signal redemption.
Undercompensation after distributive harm is less effective in
preserving relationships than equal compensation or
Postgraduate
overcompensation. However, in cases of undercompensation,
students
relational strategies (i.e., apologies) facilitate preservation.
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Relevance

Compensation

Compensation,
Structural

Repair vs no repair

No repair, apology,
denial

Compensation

Article

Haesevoets, Van
Hiel, Folmer, &
De Cremer (2014)

Study Type
Study 1:
Correlational
Study 2 & 3:
Scenario
Study 4:
Experimental

Hareli &
Eisikovits (2006)

Two policycapturing
studies

Hill (2013)

Study 1: Metaanalysis
Study 2:
Experimental

Kim, Cooper,
Dirks, & Ferrin
(2013)
Kim, Dirks,
Cooper, & Ferrin
(2006)

Kim, Ferrin,
Cooper, & Dirks
(2004)

Experimental

Experimental

Two
experimental
studies

Participant
Type

Key Findings

Overcompensation was not more effective in preserving the
relationship or in restoring cooperation as compared to equal
compensation to the damage suffered. Overcompensation
University
indicates lack of moral orientation and disfavorable
students
interpersonal trust evaluations.
Knowledge that guilt and/or shame motivated the apology
Undergraduate increased forgiveness, wherease knowledge that pity induced
students in
the apology decreased forgiveness. (Note: violation was an
Israel
insult)
Apologies that include remorse or compensation tend to have a
stronger relationship with trust-related outcomes than
Study 2:
apologies without these components, whereas apologies that
Undergraduate acknowledged violation of rules and norms had smaller and
students
sometimes negative effects.
Trust is more difficult to repair with groups than individuals,
but both groups and individuals were less trusting when
violators denied wrongdoing for competence-based violations
Undergraduate (rather than apologize) or apologized (rather than denied
students
wrongdoing) for integrity-based violations.
Competence-based trust was repaired more by apologies with
College
an internal attribution, whereas integrity-based trust was
students
repaired more by apologies with external attribution.
Study 1:
Undergraduate
students
Trust was repaired more when violators 1) apologized for
Study 2:
competence violations but denied wrongdoing for integrity
Undergraduate violations, and 2) apologized for violations where there was
and graduate
evidence of guilt but denied wrongdoing when there was
students
evidence of innocence.

24

Relevance

Compensation

Apology

Apology,
Compensation

Denial, apology

Apology

Denial, apology

Article
Lotz, Okimoto,
Schlösser, &
Fetchenhauer
(2011)

Miller, Visser, &
Staub (2005)

Study Type

Experimental

Three
experimental
studies

Ohtsubo & Yagi
(2015)

Two policycapturing
studies; One
experimental
Study 1 & 2:
Experimental
Study 3 & 4:
Correlational

Okimoto (2008)

Five
experimental
studies

Ohtsubo &
Watanabe (2009)

Participant
Type

Key Findings
Compensation was preferred over punishment after a
distributive injustice and offender-focused moral outrage (but
Undergraduate not self-focused emotions) predicted participants choosing to
students
punish offenders.
Study 1 & 2:
Undergraduate
students
Study 3:
Undergraduate
and graduate
When the incentive to cheat and surveillance were both high,
students, and
targets who resisted cheating were seen as less honest than the
staff
average person.
Participants found the costly apologizer (in terms of gift cost
or inconvenience) to be more sincere than the no-cost
Undergraduate apologizer. Participants in the costly apology condition also
students in
abstained from sending a complaint message to the unfair
Japan
person.
Participants were more likely to make a costly apology
All Studies:
(canceling plans to apologize or offering compensation) if the
University
victim was seen as being valuable, or instrumental, in
students
achieving participant's goals.
Compensation after a procedural injustice resulted in favorable
evaluations of and higher identification with the group, but
only when perceived as benevolent and when the injustice was
relevant to one's identity with the group. Perceptions of
University
membership value (as communicated by compensation)
students
explained the findings.
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Relevance

Compensation,
Structural

Structural

Apology,
Compensation

Compensation

Compensation

Article

Study Type

Reb, Goldman,
Kray, &
Cropanzano
(2006)

Study 1:
Correlational
Study 2:
Experimental

Strickland (1958)

Experimental

Participant
Type
Study 1:
Recently
terminated
employees
Study 2:
Undergraduate
students

Key Findings

Procedural injustices were associated with preference for
instrumental remedies (monetary compensation) whereas
interactional injustice was associated with a preference for
punitive remedies (disciplinary action).
"Supervisors" were more likely to trust "subordinates" when
there was less monitoring because monitoring was perceived
Undergraduate as compliance due to external sources rather than personal
students
characteristics.
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Relevance

Compensation,
Structural

Structural

Compensation. Compensation, or penance, represents a substantive (i.e., tangible) price
paid to make amends and provide assurance beyond “cheap talk” (Bottom et al., 2002) that a
similar violation will not occur in the future. Recent research has provided evidence that
compensation is useful in restoring trust. For instance, Hill (2013) conducted an experimental
study and a meta-analysis on the topic and found that apologies that include compensation
tended to have a stronger relationship with trust-related outcomes. However, much of the work
on compensation has focused on the amount of compensation provided, indicating that offers of
small amounts of reparations are as effective as larger amounts (Bottom et al., 2002), that
voluntary compensation was more effective than when it was forced (Desmet, Cremer, & van
Dijk, 2011), and that the extent to which larger amounts of compensation had an impact on trust
depended on the intentionality of the violation (Desmet, De Cremer, & van Dijk, 2011).
Therefore, compensation is expected to be useful in repairing trust because it provides
some indication that the violator is remorseful and that (s)he will make attempts to prevent
similar violations in the future. Social equilibrium perspectives suggest that when relationships
are in a state of disequilibrium, the relationship can be repaired through social rituals that
reaffirm the relationship standing and norms. Indeed, compensation represents an expression of
care and concern and an attempt to restore balance in the relationship. In a series of five studies,
Okimoto (2008) found that compensation functions as a symbol of concern for the victim of a
violation and resulted in higher identification with and evaluation of the group, as long as it was
perceived as benevolent and not as forced.
However, in line with attribution theory and previous research, providing compensation
is expected to be effective primarily in restoring trust after a competence violation. Because
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providing compensation is a signal to the trustor that causality can be attributed to the trustee’s
disposition, the evidence on trust repair overwhelmingly suggests that acknowledgement of guilt
is damaging for intent-based trust because it confirms suspicions that they lack integrity and
concern. As such, compensation is not expected to be as useful in repairing trust after an
intentional violation but is expected to be useful in repairing trust after a competence violation.
Surveillance. Structural solutions are often implemented in the workplace to deter
unwanted behavior and minimize the likelihood of future trust violations. These include rules,
contracts, regulation processes, monitoring or surveillance systems, and other controls intended
to deter and/or punish for violations (Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Surveillance is defined as “the
systematic investigation or monitoring of the actions or communications of one or more persons”
(Wigan & Clarke, 2006; p. 391). Though monitoring and surveillance are used interchangeably
in the literature, I use the term “surveillance” for this study to distinguish it from the positive,
mutually beneficial forms of monitoring often discussed in the teams literature. For the purposes
of this study, monitoring and surveillance is instead approached as a structure that is
implemented as opposed to the teamwork behaviors engaged in by a team’s members. In the case
of personal surveillance, this generally only occurs when there is a specific reason for the
monitoring, for instance to deter against particular behaviors or repression of existing behaviors,
such as detailed TSA screenings for individuals who are suspected of having ties to terrorist
organizations. Security safeguards serve several functions, including deterrence and prevention
of unwanted behavior, retribution, and building public confidence (Wigan & Clarke, 2006).
Surveillance can be used as a basis for taking action against a violator and for building
confidence that something is being done to reduce the likelihood of future threats.
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Surveillance, or performance monitoring, is commonly defined by the types of activities
that constitute it and its scope includes a wide breadth of behaviors. In providing practical
guidance for the implementation of performance monitoring systems, Amsler, Findley, and
Ingram (2001; cf Cohen, 2008) described it as consisting of (1) direct observation; (2) inspection
of completed work; (3) inspection of work in progress; (4) checklists; (5) performance indices;
(6) one-on-one performance reviews; (7) follow-up conversations; (8) informal meetings; (9)
tickle files to prompt follow-up; (10) team meetings; (11) formal presentations; (12) written
reports by subordinates; (13) reports by other individuals; (14) self-reports; and (15) electronic
surveillance.
The dominant focus in research and practice has been on management implementing
surveillance. As organizations increasingly become team-based and employees must work
together in collaborative partnerships, it is becoming increasingly relevant for peers to need or
want these systems to be in place because their own outcomes depend upon a partner’s behaviors
and contributions (similar to the way to which the organization’s or manager’s outcomes are
dependent upon subordinates’ actions). However, in peer-to-peer relationships, elaborate
surveillance systems are likely not within the scope of control of the peer collaborator. Instead,
in horizontal peer relationships, surveillance is more likely to take the form of reporting on other
individuals (see item 13 above), either by initiating or accepting third party surveillance (e.g., by
a manager). In other words, it is not likely that a typical employee can create an elaborate
surveillance system of their own that would have any true implications for reforming behaviors,
but it is within their power to tell a supervisor who does have the authority to take corrective
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action against an employee who has made an error or intentionally engaged in questionable or
unethical behaviors.
Though monitoring and surveillance have increasingly been implemented with
technological advances, relatively little work has investigated structural solutions in relationship
repair, particularly in terms of the individual factors that influence favorability and decisions to
implement (Chen & William, 2005). However, this may be due to researcher bias toward
attributional approaches, and structural solutions may, in fact, be fruitful in restoring exchange
relationships. Indeed, studies have found that trust and monitoring are negatively related
(McAllister, 1995); thus, using monitoring may actually decrease trust (Kramer, 1999). From an
attributional perspective, surveillance promotes fear and suspicion that behaviors are solely due
to external forces and that the violator cannot be trusted to behave in acceptable ways in the
absence of such systems, thereby increasing vigilance and decreasing idiosyncratic credit.
However, from a structural perspective, solutions such as surveillance can reduce
uncertainty and are expected to be useful in repairing trust because it protects the trustor and
provides some level of reassurance that the trustee will not engage in the behaviors again when
being monitored. Though attributions of intent may not be repaired under surveillance, it does
provide some level of trust in the system, or an assurance that risk of future violations is reduced.
Thus, it is expected that surveillance will be faster to restore trust after an intentional violation
than would compensation. Thus, I thus hypothesize that,
Hypothesis 4: The effect of violation type on the rate at which trust is restored will be
moderated by repair strategy, such that (a) after an intentional violation, trust will
restore significantly faster (i.e., a more positive slope) when surveillance is implemented
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than when compensation is offered, and (b) after a competence violation, trust will
restore significantly faster (i.e., a more positive slope) when compensation is provided
than when surveillance is implemented.

Summary of Hypothesized Relationships
In summary, I expect that the patterns of trust development, dissolution, and restoration
will differ based on initial levels of trust and/or trust development, whether the violation was one
of competence or intent, and the repair strategy employed. A summary of the study hypotheses
can be found in Table 2.

Table 2. Summary of study research questions and hypotheses.
H1

In collaborative interpersonal contexts, (a) initial trust (i.e., intercept) will be low and not
significantly different from zero but change in trust development (i.e., slope) will be
positive and significant (transformational theories), or (b) initial trust (i.e., intercept) will
be high and significantly different from zero but change in trust development (i.e., slope)
will be nonsignificant (swift trust).

H2

Trust will dissolve significantly faster (i.e., a more negative slope) after an intentional
violation than a competence violation

H3

Trust will restore significantly slower (i.e., a less positive slope) after an intentional
violation than a competence violation.

H4

The effect of violation type on the rate at which trust is restored will be moderated by
repair strategy, such that (a) after an intentional violation, trust will restore significantly
faster (i.e., a more positive slope) when surveillance is implemented than when
compensation is offered, and (b) after a competence violation, trust will restore
significantly faster (i.e., a more positive slope) when compensation is provided than
when surveillance is implemented.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODS AND MATERIALS
Design & Participants
In this study, violation type and repair strategy were manipulated in a 2 (violation type:
competence, intentional) x 2 (repair strategy: compensation, surveillance) factorial design. This
study utilized two sets of manipulations in order to examine the differential effects of
competence- and intentional trust violations and the utility of compensation versus surveillance
in repairing trust. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions:
(1) competence violation followed by an offer of compensation from the offender, (2)
competence violation followed by the option for the victim to implement surveillance, (3)
intentional violation followed by an offer of compensation from the offender, and (4) intentional
violation followed by the option for the victim to implement surveillance. These conditions
comprised the inter-individual, or between-person, factors. Both the participant and experimenter
were blind to the randomly assigned condition. Table 3 provides a summary of the number of
participants in each of the four conditions.

Table 3. Summary of conditions by sample location.

Country
Spain

Violation Type
Competence
Intentional
Total

US

Competence
Intentional
Total

Total

Competence
Intentional
Total

Repair Strategy
Surveillance
Compensation
20
15
11
7
31
22
19
16
18
16
37
32
39
31
29
23
68
54
32

Total
35
18
53
35
34
69
70
52
122

A total of 122 participants, including 53 undergraduate students from Spain and 69
undergraduate students from the United States participated in the study, totaling 610 cases over
five rounds of gameplay. Originally, I intended to examine the trust development, dissolution,
and restoration processes in two separate samples; however, the sample sizes were too small for
these analyses. Therefore, for the purposes of this dissertation study I collapsed across samples.
Small sample sizes also precluded analyses of measurement equivalence, though psychometrics
were examined and are reported below.
Among the participants, 62.3% (N=76) were female and 37.7% (N=46) were male.
Participants were between the ages of 18 and 41 (Mean = 21.23, SD = 3.36). Participants in the
United States were recruited via the psychology department research management system and
participants in Spain were recruited via classroom solicitation. Participants in both locations
were provided with course credit in exchange for their participation as well as a debriefing at the
conclusion of the experiment detailing the experimental purpose and design.
Experimental Task
Fulmer and Gelfand (2013) suggested that testing of trust trajectories, as well as
examining individual differences or social-contextual factors that influence these patterns, can be
done using experimental methods. In particular, they suggest that variants of the Trust Game, in
which a computer-programmed partner engages in multiple social exchanges with a participant,
are particularly appropriate for observing the impact of violations on trust dissolution and trust
restoration. The platform utilized for this study was a modified version of Colored Trails, an
interdependent, multi-player, computer-based task that can be played by humans, computers, or
heterogeneous groups consisting of both humans and computer agents (Grosz et al., 2004). This
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platform has been used previously in studies of human behavior (e.g., Katz, AmichaiHamburger, Manisterski, & Kraus, 2008; Wildman, 2010) and is appropriate for answering the
research questions in this study for several reasons.
First, in the modified version of the game used for this study, each participant completed
the task with a computer agent, which allows for the occurrence of a controlled, convincing, and
scripted trust violation and repair effort. Though participants believed they were participating
with a partner in another location, all partner behaviors and manipulations were controlled by a
computer-programmed agent. Both the experimenter and participant were blind to the conditions.
Human confederates were not employed to enact the manipulations because studies have found
that offender likeableness affects forgiveness after a violation (Bradfield & Aquino, 1999).
Therefore, the use of a computer agent allowed me to control for offender characteristics, such as
personality or other dispositional variables that could affect trust development, dissolution, and
repair in face-to-face contexts.
Second, Colored Trails provided an interdependent context that required the combined
efforts of the teammates in order to achieve the team goal. In the modified version used for this
study, participants were part of a humanitarian aid mission tasked with navigating through the
wilderness to bring food and supplies to a neighboring village. For each round of game play,
there was an ideal shortest path upon which players should have traveled to get the supplies to
town in the shortest amount of time. More specifically, players were required to travel across a
13 x 13 game board in order to reach the town (See Figure 2). Deviating from the shortest path
caused food to spoil; however, it was necessary for players to deviate from the optimal path to
pick up additional supplies (i.e., water, medicine) on their way to the village. These resource
34

pickups were negotiated by the players at the beginning of each round in order to optimize
desired outcomes. There were also pieces of additional information regarding hazards and
bonuses throughout the wilderness that are unique each player. Hazards were areas of the
wilderness that caused additional food to spoil, whereas bonuses were opportunities to gain
additional food rations. These pieces of information could be shared among players, enabling the
team to make the best decisions for creating the shortest path.

Figure 2. Screenshot of example Colored Trails game board.
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Third, Colored Trails provided a mixed-motive context, in that participants had both an
individual and a team goal. The individual goal was to collect as many coins as they could along
the way. The team goal was to get as many food rations to the town as possible, which could
only be achieved by navigating the shortest possible path or by collecting bonus food rations
along the way. These two goals were designed to be at odds with each other, meaning that
pursuing the individual goal of collecting coins would require deviating from the shortest path
and thus would spoil the food; pursuing the team goal meant not being able to collect coins on
the way to the village. Sharing the information could also allow the other player to collect coins
without any penalty to the team, as collecting a bonus food ration could compensate for deviating
from the shortest path in order to collect coins for personal gain.
To instill motivation to perform well on these goals and to invest participants in
performing well on the task, participants were told at the beginning of the experiment that there
would be a tangible incentive for performance on each goal: one $100 USD gift card would be
awarded to the highest individual and team performers. The team reward was intended to
encourage collaboration among members in order to achieve optimal team performance results,
whereas the individual reward was intended to instill a sense of competition among members.
Because individuals may be motivated by personal gain or group gain, I included these
incentives to ensure all participants were motivated to put forth effort on the task.
Violation Type
During round three of game play, one of two scripted violation types were randomly
assigned by the task software (as shown in Figures 3 and 4). The two types of scripted violation
included a mistake (i.e., a competence violation; specifically, forgetting to pick up the agreed36

upon assigned resource) and acceptance of a bribe by a bandit in the wilderness (i.e., an intent
violation). Acceptance of the bribe indicated a choice, or intentional decision, to pursue
individual goals rather than team goals, whereas a mistake signaled an unintentional error.
Participants were informed of the possibility for an encounter with a bandit who would attempt
to bribe them as well as the potential for forgetting to pick up the agreed-upon resources along
the way. In each round, participants were asked to verify that they have included their assigned
resource in their path prior to completing the round, to make the computer’s mistake more
salient. Information regarding the ramifications for committing these violations was also
provided. Both the competence and intentional trust violations harmed the team goal such that
100 food rations were forfeited. However, in the intentional violation condition, the violator
personally benefited from the sale of food rations in exchange for coins, whereas in the
competence violation condition there was no personal gain for making the mistake. Participants
were made aware of these differences during training (see Appendix A for the full training
protocol and content).

Figure 3. Screenshot of competence violation.
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Figure 4. Screenshot of intentional violation.
Repair Strategy
At the conclusion of the fourth round, one of the two repair strategies was randomly
chosen by the software. In the compensation condition (Figure 5), the computer offered the
participant 10 coins to compensate for harm done to the team as a result of making a mistake or
accepting a bribe. Because the compensation amount was the same for both violation types
(regardless of whether there was personal gain in coins or not), the amount offered was set at 10
coins to ensure some small token was offered but that it was not so high an amount as to be
deemed inappropriate or odd in the case of the mistake, in which case the violator would be
providing compensation from coins collected previously and not in connection with the
violation. Desmet, De Cremer, and van Dijk (2011a) found that as long as the compensation was
provided voluntarily (and not forced by a third party), the offer signaled repentance. Thus, the
low amount was considered appropriate. Participant interviews conducted during pilot testing
also indicated that the amount offered was sufficient.
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In contrast, the surveillance condition (Figure 6) created the perception that there was a
system in place in which negative behaviors could be monitored by the experimenter. In other
words, in this condition, the participant was provided the opportunity from the game to notify the
experimenter of the violation and provide a detailed account of what occurred. Because this
study focused on interpersonal collaborative relationships (in which victims typically have little
opportunity to monitor behavior themselves with any real consequence), I opted to mimic realworld conditions in organizations; namely, surveillance implemented by peers would be in the
form of notifying a third party in an authority role who could implement surveillance systems
and use their position of power to exact a change in behavior. Again, participant interviews from
the pilot sessions indicated that this form of surveillance was more externally valid for peer-topeer collaborative partnerships than if the participant was given the ability to implement
surveillance monitoring on their own.

Figure 5. Screenshot of compensation manipulation.

39

Figure 6. Screenshot of surveillance manipulation.
Procedure
Figure 7 chronologically summarizes the events that occurred during the experiment.
Upon entering the laboratory, participants were guided to an assigned desk labeled with a team
number. After completing the informed consent, participants were told they would be playing a
computer game with a participant in another location and that the purpose of the study was to
examine collaborative interactions among virtually distributed dyads. Prior to beginning the
experiment, participants engaged in a team building exercise and a brief training to learn about
the experimental task. Training was delivered via an interactive tutorial that explained the
purpose of the game, goals, how to assign resources and maneuver, and how to share information
with teammates. At the conclusion of the training content, five multiple-choice questions were
presented to participants to test their knowledge (see Appendix A). Participants were not able to
complete the training until they had provided the correct response for each of the test questions.
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Participants then completed a set of measures assessing individual differences, including
demographics.

Figure 7. Chronological flowchart of experimental procedure.
After completing a team building exercise (described below), training module, and a set
of measures assessing individual differences, participants began the experimental task. The task
consisted of five total rounds of game play in which participants were required to work together
interdependently to accomplish a team goal. Self-report measures of trust were completed after
each round. Rounds one and two consisted of normal game play intended for assessment of
baseline levels of trust and trust development before the violation. In round three, a randomly
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assigned trust violation (i.e., competence/mistake, intent/bribe) occurred and trust was measured
to evaluate the effect of violation on trust dissolution. At the end of round four, the computer
agent employed a randomly assigned trust repair strategy (i.e., compensation, surveillance and
trust was again measured to examine the utility of the repair strategy in repairing trust. A fifth
round of game play examined effects of repair strategy over time. At the conclusion of the
experimental session, participants were debriefed regarding the nature of the study.
Team Building Exercise
Because I utilized a computer agent instead of another participant in each of the dyadic
teams, the participants were unable to infer information about their teammate through natural,
face-to-face interaction (Jarvenpaa, Knoll, & Leidner, 1998). To ensure believability of the
computer agent “confederate” as a human partner and to establish baseline expectations about
their teammates, participants engaged in a team building task prior to beginning game play.
Participants were asked to provide information regarding their achievements as well as activities
they enjoy. They were then provided with scripted information about their “teammate’s”
achievements and a set of interests that they had in common. To control for gender biases,
participants were told their partner was of the same gender. In total, the team building task took
approximately 10 minutes to complete. The complete form and scoring protocol can be found in
Appendix B.
Measures
Prior to participating in the task, participants completed a set of individual difference
measures, including demographics. Measures of trust were assessed after each round of game
play. All self-report measures were translated into Spanish for the Spain participants.
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Specifically, the measures were translated and back-translated by different individuals to ensure
the translations accurately reflected the content of the original measure. An unbiased third party
fluent in both English and Spanish then verified that the item content was equivalent in both
versions of the measures.
Demographics
Demographic items, including age, gender, education level, employment status, and
educational performance were collected prior to beginning the task. See Appendix C for the full
scale.
Trust
Trust was assessed after each round of game play using Wildman, Fiore, and Salas' (in
progress) measure of trust and distrust. This 16-item two-dimensional measure assesses trust and
distrust as separate factors, including eight items assessing positive expectations regarding their
partner’s conduct and eight items focused on negative expectations. Sample items include, to
what extent do you feel “Confident that the other team member will try to do things that benefit
the team?” (trust) and “Afraid that the other team member will make a mistake?” (distrust). Items
were rated on a 6-point scale from not at all (1) to very much so (6). See Appendix D for the full
scale.
For the purposes of this study, only trust items were utilized because distrust was not
explicitly hypothesized as distinct from trust. Though reliabilities were generally high (α ≤ .90)
when including all items and reverse-scoring the distrust items, the results of a series of
confirmatory factor analyses indicated that a two-factor model of trust and distrust as separate
dimensions fit the data better (RMSEA = 0.087, CFI = 0.99, χ2 = 196.54) than a one factor model
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with trust and distrust combined (RMSEA = 0.216, CFI = 0.91, χ2 = 691.69). Subsequent models
including only the trust items were thus analyzed. A two-factor model that allowed the
competence- and intent-based items to correlate (RMSEA = 0.10, CFI = .98, χ2 = 43.55) fit the
data similarly to a one-factor model (RMSEA = 0.11, CFI = .98, χ2 = 50.15). Means, standard
deviations, and reliabilities are reported in Tables 4 through 6 for the combined, Spain, and
United States samples. Results of the series of confirmatory factor analyses can be found in
Table 7.

Table 4. Means, standard deviations, and correlations for trust, combined sample
Variable
1
2
3
4
5
1. Trust T1
(.91)
2. Trust T2
0.67** (.96)
3. Trust T3
0.25** 0.43** (.95)
4. Trust T4
0.33** 0.52** 0.77** (.96)
5. Trust T5
0.40** 0.57** 0.63** 0.79** (.97)
MTOTAL
4.97
4.89
3.73
4.15
4.32
SDTOTAL
0.69
0.91
1.32
1.27
1.22
Note: N = 119 (cases removed using listwise deletion). * denotes significance at p<.05. **
denotes significance at p<.01.

Table 5. Means, standard deviations, and correlations for trust, Spain
Variable
1
2
3
4
5
1. Trust T1
(.91)
2. Trust T2
0.61** (.92)
3. Trust T3
0.46** 0.61** (.95)
4. Trust T4
0.44** 0.58** 0.86** (.96)
5. Trust T5
0.39** 0.45** 0.70** 0.78** (.96)
MSP
4.81
4.61
3.72
4.05
4.12
SDSP
0.62
0.76
1.21
1.17
1.07
Note: N = 50 (cases removed using listwise deletion). * denotes significance at p<.05. ** denotes
significance at p<.01.
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Table 6. Means, standard deviations, and correlations for trust, United States
Variable
1
2
3
4
5
1. Trust T1
(.90)
2. Trust T2
0.68** (.97)
3. Trust T3
0.15
0.36** (.95)
4. Trust T4
0.27*
0.49** 0.72** (.96)
5. Trust T5
0.37** 0.61** 0.60** 0.80** (.98)
MUS
5.09
5.09
3.37
4.22
4.48
SDUS
0.72
0.96
1.40
1.35
1.30
Note: N = 69 (cases removed using listwise deletion). * denotes significance at p<.05. ** denotes
significance at p<.01.

Table 7. Confirmatory factor analysis results for trust measure.
Model
Trust & Distrust
One-factor
Two-factor (Trust/Distrust)
Trust Only
Two-factor (Competence/Intent)
One-factor

RMSEA

CFI

χ2

.22
.09

.91
.99

691.69
196.54

.10
.11

.98
.98

43.55
50.15

Analyses
Following recommendations made by Bliese & Ployhart (2002), Ployhart and
Vandenberg (2010), Singer and Willett (2003), and others, discontinuous growth modeling was
used to test the study hypotheses. Discontinuous growth models are appropriate when change is
assumed to be discontinuous, meaning there is a breaking point at which change abruptly
changes in directionality (R. E. Ployhart & Vandenberg, 2010). Because this study examines
trust development (trust assumed to be steady or increasing), trust dissolution (trust assumed to
be steady or decreasing), and trust restoration (trust assumed to be steady or increasing), sudden
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changes in trust are expected to occur as a function of the violation (see Figure 1). Therefore, use
of linear or nonlinear (cubic, quadratic) models is inappropriate, as these models force the data to
fit to a curve that does not adequately represent the data. Instead, discontinuous growth models
model time according to where the break is expected to occur and is commonly accepted in the
literature (e.g., Bliese & Ployhart, 2002; Bliese, McGurk, Thomas, Balkin, & Wesensten, 2007;
Bliese, Wesensten, & Balkin, 2006; Hale, Ployhart, & Shepherd, 2015; Singer & Willett, 2003).
All tests of the study hypotheses utilized the open-source statistical computing
environment R (R Core Development Team, 2005), specifically the Multilevel (Bliese, 2013)
and Nonlinear and Linear Mixed Effects (NLME) models packages (Pinheiro & Bates, 2000),
which uses the random coefficient model to estimate longitudinal change. Random coefficient
modeling (often referred to as hierarchical linear modeling and a form of multilevel modeling)
provides several benefits over repeated measures general linear models and latent growth curve
models that are well-suited for the hypothesized change trajectories. Namely, random coefficient
models allow for both inter- and intra-unit change while accounting for non-independence of the
data, handle missing data well, and allow for truly non-linear estimation (R. E. Ployhart &
Vandenberg, 2010).
For the purposes of this study, I generally expected that trust would increase over Times
1 and 2, drop at a transition at Time 3, then increase again afterward through Times 4 and 5
(though these patterns are expected to vary as a function of the between-person, or interindividual, predictor variables). Discontinuous growth modeling allows for the examination of
intra-individual change in trust levels and trajectories during each of the phases (Level 1), as well
as estimates of how trust levels and rate of change are affected by inter-individual factors
46

including violation type and repair strategy (Level 2). To estimate changes in means and slopes,
four Level 1 parameters were included in the model: an intercept (representing initial trust
status), a development slope, a dissolution transition, and a restoration slope. Transition
parameters compare means between two phases (e.g., dissolution transition compares mean trust
during the development and restoration phases), representing the immediate impact of an event
(i.e., the trust violation). Slope parameters represent the rate of change as indicated by the
steepness of a line formed by multiple measurement occasions of trust within a single phase
(e.g., Times 1 and 2 in the development phase), such that steep slopes represent a faster rate of
change.
The effects of time were captured with three Level 1 predictors (Equation 1). Because the
theoretical interest in this study was in how the restoration slopes differed based on violation
type and repair strategy and not on how the restoration slope was different from the development
slope, coding recommendations made by Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) for a piecewise
discontinuous model were followed. The first predictor, trust development, was coded as a vector
of sequential numbers (0, 1, 1, 1, 1). The second predictor, trust dissolution, was dummy-coded
to represent the time before and after the violation transition (0, 0, 1, 1, 1). The third predictor,
trust restoration, was coded to reflect its absence during development and the transition (0, 0, 1,
2, 3). Table 8 provides an example of the data structure for a single participant.
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Table 8. Data structure for one participant.
Subject
Round
Trust Development Dissolution Restoration Violation Repair
ID
Type
Strategy
150
1
3.50
0
0
0
0
0
150
2
3.88
1
0
0
0
0
150
3
2.38
1
1
1
0
0
150
4
2.75
1
1
2
0
0
150
5
3.13
1
1
3
0
0
*Note: Development = development slope, or linear growth rate of trust during the development
phase, prior to the violation. Dissolution = dissolution transition, or impact of violation on trust.
Restoration = restoration slope, or linear growth rate of trust during the restoration phase
following the violation transition. Violation Type = violation type coded for competence
violation or intentional violation. Repair strategy = repair strategy coded for surveillance or
compensation.

The formal analytical strategy can be broken into two primary phases. In Phase 1, the
intra-individual growth trajectories were modeled to determine the extent to which there were
individual differences in trust over time. Following recommendations made in the extant
literature (e.g., Bliese & Ployhart, 2002; Bliese et al., 2007; Lang & Bliese, 2009; Pinheiro &
Bates, 2000), a Level 1 model was first calculated to examine within-person change. The time
elements (i.e., time modeled as development, dissolution, and restoration following the timing of
the violation and repair manipulations) were included in the Phase 1 model to examine intraindividual growth trajectories prior to estimating between-person sources of variability. The
ICC(1) derived from this model provided an estimate of the percentage of the residual variance
that could be accounted for by individual differences (Level 2). In Phase 2, individual difference
variables (i.e., violation type and repair strategy) were added to the Level 2 model to explain the
residual variance in the intercept, slopes, and/or transition parameters.
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS
Phase 1: Level 1 Analyses, Assessment of Intra-individual Trust Over Time
In Phase 1, a baseline Level 1 model was estimated in order to calculate the intraclass
correlation coefficients (ICC), or the between-person variability associated with each of the
parameters after controlling for the design elements. Following recommendations in the literature
by Bliese and others, a sequential approach was taken whereby models were contrasted to
determine the variability in each of the parameters attributable to inter-individual differences.
In the first model (Equation 1), only the intercept parameter was allowed to vary (i.e.,
random effect associated with the error term in Equation 2), whereas the slopes for development,
transition, and restoration were modeled as fixed effects held constant across individuals.
Level 1
Trust 𝑡𝑖 = 𝜋0𝑖 + 𝜋1𝑖 DEV𝑡𝑖 + 𝜋2𝑖 DIS𝑡𝑖 + 𝜋3𝑖 RES𝑡𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡𝑖
Level 2
𝜋0𝑖
𝜋1𝑖
𝜋2𝑖
𝜋3𝑖

=
=
=
=

𝛾00 + 𝜁0𝑖
𝛾10
𝛾20
𝛾30

(Eq. 1)
(Eq. 2)
(Eq. 3)
(Eq. 4)
(Eq. 5)

In step 2 of Phase 1, models with fixed versus random slope parameters were contrasted
to determine the degree to which inter-individual differences exist in each of the parameters. At
each step, the -2 log-likelihood values were contrasted for the model with fixed parameters
versus models that allowed parameters to vary across individuals to determine if including a
random error term significantly improved model fit. The best fitting model at each step was
retained. Results of these tests for slope variability in the Level 1 model can be found in Table 9.
The first model (represented in Equations 1 through 5 above) restricted all slope parameters to be
equal across individuals. The second model built upon the first model to also allow the
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development slope to vary between individuals and had better fit than the intercept-only model
(thus adding an error term to Equation 2). The third model allowed the development and
transition slopes to vary (by adding an error term to Equation 3) and fit the data significantly
better than model 2. Finally, the fourth model allowed all three slopes to vary (by adding an error
term to Equation 4) and the contrast results indicated that it was the best fitting model. This
suggests that there is significant individual variability on initial trust, trust development, trust
dissolution, and trust restoration.

Table 9. Tests for slope variability in Level 1 model.
Model
1
2
3
4

Random Parameters
Intercept
DEV
DEV, DIS
DEV, DIS, RES

df
6
8
11
15

AIC
1640.10
1583.95
1525.08
1485.15

-2LogLik
1628.10
1567.96
1503.08
1455.14

Test

L.Ratio

p-val

1 vs 2
2 vs 3
3 vs 4

60.15
64.87
47.93

<.0001
<.0001
<.0001

Prior to estimating the model to examine the conditional ICC, an examination of the
within-individual error structure, particularly for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, was also
conducted (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002). In particular, separate analyses were conducted to contrast
model fit for the baseline model (intercept and all slopes allowed to vary) with a model that also
included an error-structure term. In the first contrast, an autocorrelation term was included to
determine if there was a significant lag 1 serial autocorrelation, which would indicate that the
correlation among trust assessments would be more highly correlated when the measurement
time points were closer to one another. Contrast results provided no evidence of a lag1
autocorrelation (log-likelihood ratio = 0.04, p = .84). In the second contrast, a test for
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heteroscedasticity was conducted to determine if the amount of residual variance was
significantly different across measurement occasions. There also was not evidence for a
significant amount of heteroscedasticity (log-likelihood ratio = 3.02, p = .08). Contrast results for
both terms were non-significant and thus, the final model for Level 1 did not include these
within-individual error terms. The model estimates for the final Level 1 model are provided in
Table 10 (Model 1).
Intraclass Correlation Coefficient
The ICC(1) was calculated using the parameter estimates from the final Level 1 model. In
the current study, ICC(1) indicates the proportion of the variability in trust that is due to
between-person differences across the five measurements of trust. The ICC(1) is calculated as
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 (𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛−𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛) 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 +𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 (𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛−𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛) 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒

(Lang & Bliese, 2009). Results indicated that

54% of the total variance in trust across time (ICC = .54), a considerable amount (Bliese, 2000),
could be attributed to between-person differences. This variability can be seen in Figure 8, which
consists of plots for each individual who participated in the study.
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Figure 8. Individual participant trust trajectories.

Hypothesis 1
The competing theories hypothesis and strong inference test posed in this study sought to
investigate the competing theories of transformational models of trust and swift trust in
collaborative interpersonal contexts. Specifically, trust transformation would be supported by a
pattern of low initial trust (i.e., intercept not significantly different than zero) and development of
trust between Times 1 and 2 (i.e., significant development slope). Theories of swift trust, on the
other hand, would be supported by evidence of high initial trust (i.e., intercept significantly
different from zero) and no development of trust (i.e., non-significant development slope).
Results from the final Level 1 model (see Table 10, Model 1) suggest that initial levels of
trust were generally high and significantly different from zero (π0i = 4.97, p < .01). Furthermore,
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though there was significant dissolution of trust (π2i = -1.42, p < .01) and significant restoration
(π3i = 0.30, p < .01), on average, trust did not develop early in the relationship. In fact, trust
decreased slightly by .07 points, although this change was not significant (p = .28). This pattern
of results suggests that initial trust was high and did not change significantly from Time 1 to
Time 2. Further examination indicated that the flat development slope was not caused by a
ceiling effect, as trust was measured on a 6-point scale. Of the 121 participants who had
complete data to estimate changes in trust during the development period, 50 participants
indicated their trust decreased slightly (41.3%), 22 had no change in trust (18.2%), and 49 had a
positive change in trust (40.5%), with 110 of the participants (91%) changing one point or less
(positive or negative) during this time. Furthermore, there was less variance in the trust
development slope (τ = .09, SD = .30) than in dissolution (τ = 1.91, SD = 1.38) and restoration (τ
= .19, SD = .44). The pattern of trust development across all participants can be seen in Figure 9.
Given trust was high initially and generally did not develop over time, the pattern of results
provide support for theories of swift trust and Hypothesis 1b was supported.
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Figure 9. Trust trajectory (mean levels of trust) across participants for all measurement periods.
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Table 10. Results for final Level 1 model and hypothesis tests.
Fixed Effects
Level 1 Model (π)
Intercept
Development
Dissolution
Restoration
Level 2 Model (ϒ)
Violation Type
Repair Strategy
Violation Type * Repair Strategy
Violation Type * Dissolution
Violation Type * Restoration
Repair Strategy * Restoration
Violation Type * Repair Strategy * Restoration
Pseudo R2

Model 1
Coef
SE
4.97***
-0.07
-1.42***
0.30***

0.06
0.07
0.15
0.05

Model 2
Coef
SE

Model 3
Coef
SE

Model 4
Coef
SE

5.04***
-0.07
-1.34***
0.30***

0.08
0.07
0.17
0.05

5.03***
-0.07
-1.42***
0.37***

0.08
0.06
0.15
0.06

5.06***
-0.07
-1.43***
0.32***

0.11
0.07
0.15
0.06

-0.16

0.13

-0.16

0.12

-0.35**
-0.06
0.42*

0.16
0.16
0.24

-0.21

0.17
-0.16*** 0.06

-0.01
0.08
0.12*
0.08
-0.32*** 0.12
0.060
Model 4
Var
SD
0.26
0.51
0.10
0.31
1.90
1.38
0.19
0.43
0.23
0.48
Violation type coded as

0.017
0.014
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Variance Components
Var
SD
Var
SD
Var
SD
Intercept (B/T)
0.27
0.52
0.27
0.52
0.27
0.52
Development slope
0.09
0.30
0.10
0.31
0.10
0.31
Dissolution transition
1.90
1.38
1.97
1. 40
1.91
1.38
Restoration slope
0.19
0.44
0.19
0.44
0.18
0.42
Residual (W/I)
0.23
0.48
0.23
0.48
0.23
0.48
Note: * denotes significance at p<.10. ** denotes significance at p<.05. *** denotes significance at p<.01.
0 for competence and 1 for intentional. Repair strategy coded as 0 for surveillance and 1 for compensation.
Model 1 = Final Level 1 model and test of competing trust development theories. Model 2 = Test of effect of violation type on
dissolution. Model 3 = Test of effect of violation type on restoration. Model 4 = Test of interaction between violation type, repair
strategy, and restoration.
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Phase 2: Level 2 Analyses, Assessment Inter-individual Differences in Trust Over Time
Phase 2 consisted of adding the between-person Level 2 predictors, trust violation type
and repair strategy type, to examine parameter variability according to the best fitting model in
Phase 1 (the final Level 1 model). Because these are categorical predictors being entered into a
regression equation, dummy codes were assigned for both violation type (0 = competence, 1 =
intentional) and repair strategy (0 = surveillance, 1 = compensation). Thus, the equations
including all Level 2 variables is as follows:
Level 1
Trust 𝑡𝑖 = 𝜋0𝑖 + 𝜋1𝑖 DEV𝑡𝑖 + 𝜋2𝑖 DIS𝑡𝑖 + 𝜋3𝑖 RES𝑡𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡𝑖
Level 2
𝜋0𝑖 = 𝛾00 + 𝜁0𝑖
𝜋1𝑖 = 𝛾10 + 𝜁1𝑖
𝜋2𝑖 = 𝛾20 + 𝛾21 VT + 𝜁2𝑖
𝜋3𝑖 = 𝛾30 + 𝛾31 VT + 𝛾32 RS + 𝛾33 (VT ∗ RS) + 𝜁3𝑖

(Eq. 6)
(Eq. 7)
(Eq. 8)
(Eq. 9)
(Eq. 10)

Before presenting the results of the random coefficient models for Hypotheses 1 through
3, it should be noted that in growth modeling, time is a Level 1 predictor of the outcome at a
given time (in this case, three separate time variables to represent each phase, which ultimately
summarize the trajectory in its totality). When between-person (Level 2) variables are modeled
as predictors of Level 1 variables (e.g., time), an interaction term between the Level 1 and Level
2 variable is created in order to predict overall growth in the outcome. In the analyses herein,
therefore, the main effects of trust patterns in a particular time period (e.g., during trust
restoration) are modeled as an interaction. For instance, trust violation type as a predictor of the
magnitude of trust dissolution is mathematically represented by Violation Type x Restoration.
Extending upon this, when two Level 2 predictors interact with a Level 1 time variable (e.g.,
Hypothesis 4, in which violation type and repair strategy interact to predict the rate at which trust
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is restored), a three-way interaction is created. For the current study, following a procedure
similar to Hale and colleagues (2015), only parameters and higher-order interactions of interest
were added to each separate set of analyses.
Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 suggested that trust dissolution would be greater after an intentional
violation as compared to a competence violation. To test for systematic differences in trust
dissolution, violation type was entered as a Level 2 predictor of the Level 1 parameter for trust
dissolution (Equation 9). On average, trust decreased by 1.42 points as a result of the violation.
However, as indicated in model 2 of Table 10, regression results indicated that there was not a
significant effect of violation type on trust dissolution (ϒ = -0.21, p = .14). A visual examination
of dissolution after a competence versus intent violation can be seen in Figure 10, which supports
the statistical findings.
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Trust
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Violation
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3
Pre-Violation

Post-Violation

Figure 10. Trust dissolution after a competence versus intentional violation.
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Additional analyses were conducted to determine if the different types of violations had
significantly different impacts on trust in competence versus trust in intent. In particular, the
same model as above was evaluated, but by separating trust in competence and trust in intent as
separate constructs. As indicated in Table 11 and Figures 11 and 12, results suggested that
whereas intentional violations were significantly more damaging than competence violations in
terms of dissolving trust in intent (Model 2b; ϒ = -0.37, p <.05), there was no significant
difference in the impact of intentional violations on competence-based trust dissolution (ϒ = 0.03, p = .87). In both cases, however, trust dissolution was significant (competence-based trust
dissolution, ϒ = -1.44, p<.001; intent-based trust dissolution, ϒ = -1.64, p < .001). These results
suggest that intentional and competence violations were equally damaging to perceptions of
ability, but intentional violations were more damaging to perceptions of character than
competence. Thus, these results provided support for Hypothesis 2.

58

Table 11. Competence-based and intent-based trust dissolution.

Fixed Effects
Level 1 Model (π)
Intercept
Development
Dissolution
Restoration
Level 2 Model (ϒ)
Violation Type
Violation Type * Dissolution
Pseudo R2

Coef

Model 2a
SE

5.06***
-0.04
-1.41***
0.30***

0.08
0.07
0.13
0.05

-0.10
-0.03
0.008

0.12
0.18

Model 2b
Coef
SE
5.01***
-0.11
-1.27***
0.31***

0.09
0.08
0.17
0.05

-0.20
0.14
-0.37**
0.18
0.013
Model 2a
Model 2b
Variance Components
Var
SD
Var
SD
Intercept (B/T)
0.24
0.49
0.32
0.57
Development slope
0.09
0.30
0.10
0.32
Dissolution transition
2.10
1.45
1.99
1.41
Restoration slope
0.21
0.46
0.20
0.44
Residual (W/I)
0.26
0.51
0.30
0.55
Note: * denotes significance at p<.10. ** denotes significance at p<.05.
*** denotes significance at p<.01. DEV = Trust development.
DIS = Trust dissolution. RES = Trust restoration.
VT = Violation type, coded as 0 for competence and 1 for intentional.
Model 2a = Trust in competence as outcome
Model 2b = Trust in intent as outcome
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Figure 11. Competence-based trust dissolution after a competence versus intentional violation.
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Figure 12. Intent-based trust dissolution after a competence versus intentional violation.
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Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 focused on the differential effects of trust violation type in predicting trust
restoration. On average, trust increased by .30 points per time period during restoration.
According to results presented in model 4 of Table 10 for the tests of Hypothesis 4, the main
effect of trust violation type on trust restoration was not significant. However, following
suggestions made by Bliese and colleagues (2007) a separate model without the main effect of
repair strategy on restoration and interaction between violation type and repair strategy was
estimated. This was done to ensure the t-value for the main effect of violation type on restoration
was not suppressed by the interaction terms. Indeed, as indicated by the results presented for
Model 3 of Table 10 and Figure 13, the rate at which trust was restored was significantly slower
after an intentional violation than after a competence violation (ϒ = -0.16, p <.01). Thus,
Hypothesis 3 was supported.
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Figure 13. Trust restoration after a competence versus intentional violation.
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Hypothesis 4
Finally, Hypothesis 4 suggested that the effect of trust violation type on trust restoration
would be moderated by repair strategy, such that (a) trust would be repaired more quickly after
an intentional violation if surveillance was implemented, whereas (b) trust would restore more
quickly after a competence violation if compensation was offered. As indicated in model 4 of
Table 10 and as shown in Figure 14, the interaction between violation type, repair strategy, and
restoration was significant (ϒ = -0.32, p < .05). However, to test the hypotheses, examination of
the simple interactions was necessary. Following recommendations made by Spiller, Fitzsimons,
Lynch, and McClelland (2013) for examining simple effects in the case of a 2 x 2 x continuous
three-way interaction, I conducted a series of follow-up analyses (see Table 12). Spotlight
analyses provide estimates of the simple effects of a variable at specified values of another.
Because violation type and repair strategy were dummy-coded as 0’s and 1’s, the results for the
simple effects presented in Table 10 only tell part of the story. For instance, in model 4a of Table
12, the interaction term for violation type and the restoration slope provides an estimate of the
difference in the rate of restoration after an intentional violation compared to a competence
violation when surveillance is implemented. Conversely, the interaction term for repair strategy
and restoration provides an estimate for the difference in the rate of restoration when
compensation is provided compared to when surveillance is implemented after a competence
violation.
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Figure 14. Trust restoration by condition
Therefore, three additional analyses were conducted to analyze all simple effects
contained in the higher-order interaction. In support of Hypothesis 4a, the interaction term for
repair strategy and restoration in Model 4d was significant, indicating the rate of restoration was
faster when surveillance was implemented after an intentional violation as compared to when
compensation was offered (ϒ = 0.33, p < .05). However, Hypothesis 4b was not supported. As
indicated by the interaction term for repair strategy and restoration in model 4a, though the effect
approached significance ( ϒ = 0.12, p =.10), restoration was not significantly faster when
compensation was provided after a competence violation as compared to when surveillance was
provided. These patterns are visually depicted in Figure 14.
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Table 12. Spotlight analyses for interaction between violation type, repair strategy, and trust restoration.
Model 4a
Coef
SE

Model 4b
Coef
SE

Model 4c
Coef
SE

Fixed Effects
Level 1 Model (π)
Intercept
5.06*** 0.11
5.00*** 0.12
4.72*** 0.13
Development
-0.07
0.07 -0.07
0.07 -0.07
0.07
Dissolution
-1.43*** 0.15 -1.43*** 0.15 -1.43*** 0.15
Restoration
0.32*** 0.06
0.44*** 0.07
0.30*** 0.07
Level 2 Model (ϒ)
Violation Type
-0.35** 0.16
0.07
0.19
0.35**
0.16
Repair Strategy
-0.06
0.16
0.06
0.16
0.36*
0.19
Violation Type * Repair Strategy
0.42*
0.24 -0.42*
0.25 -0.42*
0.25
Violation Type * Dissolution
Violation Type * Restoration
-0.01
0.08 -0.33*** 0.09
0.01
0.08
Repair Strategy * Restoration
0.12*
0.08 -0.12*
0.08 -0.20** 0.09
Violation Type * Repair Strategy * Restoration -0.32*** 0.12
0.32*** 0.12
0.32*** 0.12
Note: * denotes significance at p<.10. ** denotes significance at p<.05. *** denotes significance at p<.01.
Model 4a = Intentional (VT) and Compensation (RS) coded as 1. Same results as Model 3 in Table 5.
Model 4b = Intentional (VT) and Surveillance (RS) coded as 1.
Model 4c = Competence (VT) and Compensation (RS) coded as 1.
Model 4d = Competence (VT) and Surveillance (RS) coded as 1.
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Model 4d
Coef
SE
5.07***
-0.07
-1.43***
0.11

0.14
0.07
0.15
0.08

-0.07
-0.36*
0.42*

0.19
0.19
0.25

0.33***
0.20**
-0.32***

0.09
0.09
0.12

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION
Drawing upon theories of collaboration and relationship repair, this study presents theory
and empirical evidence supporting the investigation of interpersonal trust in collaborative
partnerships as a process that evolves over time. More specifically, this study investigated
competing theories of trust development, including transformational theories (that suggest trust
begins low and develops over time) and swift trust (that suggests trust begins and remains high
when individuals can draw from available information). This study also investigated the relative
impact of competence versus intentional violations on trust dissolution, or the immediate shortterm decrease in trust, as well as the long-term effects of these two types of violations on the rate
at which trust restored in the long-term. Finally, the joint effects of violation type and repair
strategy (namely, compensation and surveillance) on the rate at which trust was restored was
investigated.
Hypothesis 1 was a strong inference test that tested competitive theories to determine if
trust development in collaborative interpersonal contexts would follow swift trust theories or
transformational theories, specifically if it would be high at the outset and remain at that level
through development or if it would start at low or nonexistent levels and increase over time.
Results indicated that trust was indeed high at the outset and stayed at that level until trust was
violated at Time 3. Further examination of the results of Model 1 (Table 10) indicate that trust
had a steep decline after the violation and steady growth thereafter, providing further support that
individuals truly trusted their teammates at the outset and that the reported trust levels were
likely calibrated to actual trust levels. Thus, although the time period for trust development only
consisted of two time points, an examination of the rate of change relative to change elsewhere
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in the model suggests when individuals need to begin working together immediately, they draw
from existing knowledge structures, or mental models, to derive expectations for behavior. In
this case, the participants (undergraduate students) were likely accustomed to working with their
peers on tasks and assumed they would be able to complete a simple task and would not
intentionally detract from the team goals. In other words, when working with a new partner
whom they know little about, people are able to draw from what they know in order to enter the
relationship with a high level of trust.
Hypothesis 2 proposed that trust would be damaged more by an intentional violation.
Though the initial hypothesis test of the violation’s impact on overall trust did not find evidence
that intentional violations were more damaging to overall trust, results of follow-up analyses
investigating trust in competence and trust in intent separately did find support for this
hypothesis. Specifically, in line with the theoretical arguments put forth in the hypothesis
development, these results suggest that intentional violations were more damaging to perceptions
of character than were competence violations, and were equally damaging to perceptions of
ability as compared to competence violations. In other words, whereas competence violations
had relatively less impact on perceived integrity, intentional violations demonstrated spillover
effects to damage not only trust in integrity but also perceived ability.
Additionally, Hypothesis 3 proposed that trust restoration would be slower after an
intentional violation than a competence violation, which was also supported. Taken together, the
findings from Hypotheses 2 and 3 are interesting because together they provide support for the
notion that intentional violations are considered to be so generalizable and such a flaw that they
not only effect short-term and long-term trust but also exhibit spillover to also affect perceived
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ability despite the lack of actual evidence of decreased capability to perform the task at hand.
Simply stated, when a person makes a mistake it damages trust in his or her ability to perform
the task but trust can be restored relatively quickly; however, intentionally causing harm
damages trust in both one’s integrity and their ability, and this damage is long-lasting and
difficult to repair.
Finally, Hypothesis 4 suggested that there would be an interaction between violation type
and repair strategy in predicting trust restoration. Indeed, this interaction accounted for six
percent of the variance in trust over time, of which 4.6% was above and beyond violation type
alone (1.4%). Results provided support for Hypothesis 4a, indicating that trust did increase at a
faster rate after an intentional violation when surveillance was implemented as compared to
when compensation was offered. On the other hand, Hypothesis 4b, which proposed that after a
competence violation trust would restore at a faster rate of change if compensation was offered
than if surveillance was implemented, was not supported. However, the effect size for this
relationship was significant at p < .10 and therefore should not be completely dismissed, as the
relationship may hold with a larger sample or more measurement time points. This suggests that
after an intentional violation, surveillance is a better repair strategy to use than an offer of
compensation, but offering compensation to make up for harm done is a slightly better option
when the offense is accidental.
One important note should be made regarding interpretation of results of Hypotheses 3
and 4, which investigated trust restoration. In the statistical model, trust restoration was modeled
as a linear growth function from times 3 through 5. Though a model with a quadratic polynomial
for the restoration term was also estimated, it did not provide better fit than the linear model.
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Namely, though particular individuals or conditions may have had non-linear growth slopes (e.g.,
trust increased and then decreased again during restoration), the quadratic functional form did
not fit the overall data better. Therefore, following recommendations made by Bliese (2000) and
others, I retained the linear growth model.
Implications
The study findings have important methodological, theoretical, and practical
implications. In terms of advancing theory and methods related to examining trust development,
violation, and repair, this study has several implications. First, this study suggests at a basic level
that the investigation of alternative trust repair strategies and their utility in repairing trust is a
fruitful endeavor. This study provides empirical evidence for the use of surveillance technologies
in collaborative contexts. Though surveillance has been examined from the trustee’s standpoint
(i.e., how the individual feels about being monitored) and is typically examined from the lens of
organizational hierarchies or authority, less is known about surveillance or other structural
methods of repairing interpersonal trust amongst peers in collaborative relationships. This study
provides a starting point for examining other strategies that can be employed by the trustor,
rather than the trustee, in terms of restoring trust.
While the results related to trust repair strategies are important, another important goal of
this research was to extend upon existing research by taking a process-based approach to
studying how trust evolves. Despite the abundance of theory suggesting that trust changes over
time, this study is one of the first to examine trust as a process that unfolds with time. As
discussed previously, AET emphasizes that attitudes can vary not only between individuals but
also within. Indeed, this assertion has received empirical support in previous studies, with one
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study finding that 60% of the variance in mood and affect reside within-person (Miner, Glomb,
Hulin, & Anonymous, 2005). However, conventional methods for assessing attitudes are focused
around between-person analysis and treat within-person variance as error. To address this issue,
the emotions literature has begun to utilize experience sampling methods (ESM) and multilevel
statistical analysis in order to assess both within and between person effects (Judge et al., 2010).
This study investigated trust over multiple measurement time points, both within- and between
individuals. Indeed, the results of this study found that when examining trust over time,
approximately 54% of the residual variance was attributable to inter-individual, or betweenperson, factors whereas 46% was attributable to within-person variation. This suggests that the
current commonplace cross-sectional designs are missing a substantial portion of the story.
Overall, this study provides evidence that factoring time into investigations of
organizational phenomena is an important next step for furthering organizational research. The
results of the current study indicated that although there may not be significantly larger impacts
on overall trust immediately after a violation depending on the type of violation, the rate at
which trust restores is different depending on the violation type. Furthermore, the effects of the
type of violation and repair strategy jointly interacted with time to suggest that the rate at which
trust changes is different depending on the type of violation and the type of repair strategy. One
important consideration to draw from these findings is that cross-sectional theory does not
perfectly translate to theories of time. Therefore, though one type of repair strategy may have a
large immediate impact, it may be the case there are diminishing returns over time, meaning trust
may increase quickly at first and then level off again. Similarly, it may be the case that it takes
time for a repair strategy to have an effect and that the utility of a particular repair tactic is not
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evident until some period of time has passed. Therefore, too few time periods or measurements
that are not timed appropriately may miss important details (Ployhart, Holtz, & Bliese, 2002). In
particular, Ployhart and colleagues (2010, 2013) suggest that longitudinal theory should seek to
answer questions of how long the effects should occur, if the strength of the effect will change
over time, why the strength of the effect should change, and what the process of change is.
This study also has several practical implications. First, study findings suggested that in
collaborative contexts, trust may not need to develop over long periods of time but rather begin
at a high level and remain as such (at least until a violation occurs). Therefore, if organizations
need trust to begin at a high level, environmental cues or information that serves as a basis for
trust expectations can be provided. For instance, to foster high trust early in a new partnership or
collaboration, supervisors can be instructed to provide information about the educational
background or work experience of an individual, or other personal information that provides
insight into an individual’s character (e.g., interests, hobbies) can be provided.
Second, though all violations should be avoided in collaborative contexts, as both
competence and intentional violations have significant impacts on trust levels and trust is
important for a myriad of organizational outcomes, the findings suggest that intentional
violations take substantially longer to recover from. Therefore, particular emphasis should be
placed on ensuring individuals are behaving with high integrity. Though much of our science and
our selection techniques focus on the knowledge and skills of an employee or teammate,
behavior in interpersonal interactions can be even more important in some respects. As such, this
reinforces the idea that organizations should focus on the behavioral integrity of the individuals
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in the organization, through selection and promotion (e.g., personnel records) or development
(e.g., ethics training, mentoring, conflict resolution).
Third, though studies have found that surveillance can be detrimental to an employee’s
well-being and attitudes when they know they are being monitored, this study suggests that in
interdependent peer relationships, the knowledge that a third party is watching for problems can
be effective for repairing trust perceptions after a violation. This idea can also be extended to
other contexts, such as in educational settings, where students are dependent upon each other for
their class grades on group projects. Creating an environment where the individual can choose to
notify an authority figure can help to restore trust and reboot the relationship. Thus,
organizations should ensure their members understand that the worst kind of offense is one done
on purpose, but if they do engage in unethical behavior the best course of action is for
supervisors to create a climate that makes it acceptable and accessible for subordinates to report
ethical issues.
Limitations and Future Research
As with other empirical work, there are limitations to this study. First, this was a
laboratory study with undergraduate students and therefore, these research questions should be
investigated in other types of organizations (e.g., employees in corporations, hospitals) and
relationships (e.g., friends, spouses, supervisor and subordinate) to determine if the results are
generalizable to other populations. Though many of the results were highly significant, effect
sizes tend to be higher in controlled experiments and thus may not play out in organizational
settings. This study utilized a computer agent confederate and thus, the interactions were
relatively controlled based on programming decisions. Though participants interviewed during
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debriefing for pilot sessions indicated that the computer agent was believable and they were
unaware that it was not another person, the interactions were one-way, meaning they were highly
controlled and thus may not be generalizable to person-person interactions. Future research
should investigate trust violation and repair when both participants are human to determine if
there are interactive effects that might change these trust trajectories.
Additionally, in the surveillance manipulation, participants were provided the opportunity
to notify the experimenter, but it was not mandatory and nothing was reported to the
experimenter in reality. Thus, there were no true ramifications to the “confederate” agent’s
outcomes. However, in real-world dyadic interpersonal relationships, the implementation of
surveillance would likely be known (at least eventually) by the offender and thus could have
implications for how (s)he engaged with the trustor. Simply stated, knowing that a partner has
told an authority figure about the transgression could be construed as tattle-taling and thus would
impact not only the trust of the trustor but also the violator’s perceptions of relationship quality
and future behaviors toward the trustor. Given the literature on surveillance from the trustee’s
perspective as being detrimental to employee attitudes, future research should investigate thirdparty surveillance from both perspectives simultaneously.
Third, though this study used a longitudinal approach to investigate trust as a process,
examining trust perceptions after five distinct performance episodes. However, because it was a
laboratory study, the time periods between these assessments was short and the entire study
session was approximately two hours. Therefore, the pattern of trust development, dissolution,
and restoration may be different over longer periods of time and thus should be studied either in
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a controlled laboratory setting with multiple sessions or in organizational contexts, such as using
experience sampling methods.
Fourth, though I attempted to investigate the study hypotheses separately in the US and
Spain samples, due to sample size issues in some of the cells, this led to problems with the data
and thus, I concluded that the findings would not be theoretically meaningful if the samples were
separated. As such, for the current study US and Spain participants were combined into a single
sample. Similarly, though measurement equivalence analyses were planned for the current study
to verify that trust was being conceptualized in the same way over time, again there were sample
size issues and thus the model fit indices would not have been accurate if reported. Additional
data collection in the future may help to alleviate these sample size issues.
From a theoretical standpoint, there are several areas for future research that can build
upon these findings. First, in line with Mayer and collagues, this study focused on trust only and
not distrust. However, Lewicki and colleagues have suggested that distrust is a separate and
distinct negatively-valenced construct characterized by paranoia and fear rather than the absence
of trust. Future research should investigate how distrust evolves over time as a distinct process
from trust.
Furthermore, this study focused explicitly on the process by which trust unfolds over
time. However, there was considerable between-person variability as indicated by the ICC,
suggesting that there may be important individual differences that further explain how trust
develops, dissolves, and restores. Similarly, trust has been linked to a wide variety of
organizational outcomes. Future research should investigate the dynamic relationships between
these antecedents and outcomes to determine if, for instance, they are related only under certain
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conditions or at certain points, if the strength of the relationship changes over time, or if the
relationships remain stable. The use of longitudinal, process-focused approaches and the
examination of time-varying predictors and dynamic relationships will have important
implications for application of findings from the current literature base.
Conclusion
In sum, the findings from the study provide three main take-aways. First, trust does not
need to develop over the long-term in collaborative relationships. Instead, swift trust, or high
trust at the outset of a relationship, can be fostered by providing information or cultivating
experiences that individuals can draw from in making trust assessments. Second, intentional acts
of harm in collaborative relationships are worse than accidental wrongdoings in both the
immediate and the long-term. Organizations can help to mitigate these problems by (1) avoiding
ethical issues and conflict through selection or training protocols, or (2) by putting safeguards in
place to monitor problem employees, including providing opportunities for others to report
problems when they arise. Finally, trust evolves over time and it is important for organizations
and researchers alike to consider when events occur, how long they have an impact, and how the
impact of a violation or repair strategy may increase or diminish as time passes.
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APPENDIX A: TRAINING PROTOCOL & KNOWLEDGE TEST
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Training Protocol & Knowledge Test
Welcome to the Color Trails Game training! Today you will be playing a computer game where
you and a partner are part of a humanitarian aid organization, and your job is to navigate across a
stretch of wilderness in order to deliver food to a town in need.
Continue
You will be the Blue Player in the game. The path you draw will be blue, and all icons outlined
in blue “belong” to you.
Previous
Continue
The basic goal of the game is to deliver as much food to the town as possible. At the end of this
experiment, both team members will have an opportunity to receive an Amazon gift card if they
deliver the most food to the town as a team. At the same time, both players have the opportunity
to collect gold coins as you travel across the wilderness by crossing the squares with treasure
chests on them. You can only collect coins that are outlined in your color. Each coin square gives
you 40 coins.
Previous
Continue
These gold coins do not help the team, but the individual who collects the most gold coins will
have an opportunity to receive an Amazon gift card at the end of the experiment. This is in
addition to the gift card that can be earned based on food delivery.
Previous
Continue
So now that you understand the goal, let’s talk about how to play the game. Each player begins
their journey at the “start” square at the bottom of the grid and must determine a path through the
wilderness that ends at the town at the top of the grid.
Previous
Continue
You may only move in up, down, left, and right directions (no diagonals). The areas you see in
black are impassable areas; you cannot draw your path through black squares.
Previous
Continue
Along the way, your team must pick up the medicine and water that is placed within the grid, and
each player can only pick up one of the two packages. If your team fails to pick up one of the
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packages, your team will have to spend 100 food rations once reaching the town to buy the
supplies you forgot, meaning your team will lose 100 food rations as a result of the mistake. At
this time please click on the water icon on the game board.
At this time please click on the medicine icon on the game board.
You and the other player must plan routes to pickup and deliver this water and medicine, along
with your food, to the town. You will both begin the game with equal amounts of food to
transport. Each square of travel consumes 1 ration of food, thus shorter routes consume less food
and vice versa. Also, the amount of food you deliver during each round will influence how much
food you start with during the next round – meaning, the more food you waste, the less food you
have to deliver in the next round (and the less extra compensation your team can earn).
Previous
Continue
Along with the medicine and water pickup points, there are other important spaces in the
wilderness that you can cross, which can either help or hurt the team:
Previous
Continue
Bonus (green circle with green plus sign in middle) – this adds 10 food rations to your delivery.
Previous
Continue
Hazard (exclamation point inside triangle) – this removes 10 food rations from your delivery.
Previous
Continue
A good way to increase your team score is to make sure you avoid hazards and pass through
bonuses that are near your desired path. If you cross any hazards and bonuses of either color,
even if you can’t see them, they will still impact the team score. If at any time during the game
you need to see a description of the icons on your screen, you can check the “show descriptions”
box on the bottom of the game screen. At this time, please click the “show descriptions”
checkbox.
Previous
Continue
And one more thing – in each round of Color Trails, it is possible that either player will be
approached by a wilderness bandit who may offer that player a bribe. This can happen randomly
in any round – you will receive a popup message like the one you see here. If you are approached
by a wilderness bandit during the game, you will have the choice to accept or decline the bribe
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that is offered to you. This bribe will have consequences for the team’s goal, so consider it
carefully if you are approached!
Previous
Continue
You have encountered a bandit in the wilderness who is offering to give you 100 gold coins in
exchange for 100 of the team’s food rations that you are transporting. Will you accept this bribe?
Accept
Do not accept
There are five basic steps you must take in every round of Color Trails
Previous
Continue
The first step is to decide which team member is going to pick up the food and water. To do this,
you can propose goals by clicking the “assign goals” button on the bottom right of the game
screen. Choose which team member will be responsible for collecting medicine or water
respectively. Either player may choose this option, thus whichever player selects it first will have
their proposal displayed by the other first. It is of no importance which player proposes this
choice, so long as both players agree to who will pick up water and who will pick up medicine.
At this time, please click the assign goals button.
The second step is to share information about the wilderness with your partner, if you would like
to do so. You have the option to share with your teammate the hazards and bonuses on your
screen that are outlined in your color. Keep in mind that if you do not share this information, the
other player will not know about these spots on the grid. Sharing them will allow your teammate
to plan his or her route to include/avoid these spaces. You can share an item with your teammate
by right clicking it and selecting “Share with red team member/Share with blue team member.”
At this time, please right click the highlighted hazard and share it.
Share with Red Team Member
The third step is to draw your route to the village. Remember, you must pick up your assigned
objective (either water or medicine, as decided in step 1), and then deliver your objective to the
village. While planning your route, be mindful of the different “information” on the map. To
draw your path, click on the squares to indicate the route you would like to take (remember, you
can only make up, down, left, and right movements). Click continue to see a path being drawn.
Previous
Continue
The fourth step is to travel along your path. Once you have completed drawing the route that you
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wish to take, select the “Hit the road!” button on the bottom right of the game screen. Wait
quietly at the computer until your other team member has finished their route and hit the road as
well. At this time, please click the “Hit the road!” button.
After each round of the game, please complete the survey shown and wait quietly until your
other team member has finished.
Previous
Continue
You have now completed the Color Trails training. At this time you will be given five questions
to evaluate your understanding of the game.
Previous
Continue
Please click on your answer.
1.
What is the main goal of the game?
a. To cross as many hazards as possible
b. To collect as many gold coins as possible
c. To deliver as much food to the town as possible (Correct Answer)
d. To draw the longest path possible
That is correct!
That is incorrect. Please try again.
Please click on your answer
2.
Which of the following shows the correct order of steps in the game?
a. Share information, assign goals, hit the road, draw path
b. Assign goals, share information, draw path, hit the road (Correct Answer)
c. Draw path, assign goals, share information, hit the road
d. Share information, hit the road, draw path, assign goals
That is correct!
That is incorrect. Please try again.
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Please click on your answer.
3.
How do you share information with the other player?
a. Yell it at them from the other room
b. Type it in the chat window
c. Tell the experimenter to tell them
d. Right-click the information and select “Share with Red Team Member” (Correct
Answer)
That is correct!
That is incorrect. Please try again.
Please click on your answer
4.
What will NOT harm your team’s score?
a. Accepting the bribe
b. Hazard squares
c. Bonus squares (Correct Answer)
d. Forgetting to pick up water and medicine packages
That is correct!
That is incorrect. Please try again.
Please click on your answer
5.
Which of the following will improve your individual score?
a. Accepting the bribe (Correct Answer)
b. Hazard squares
c. Bonus squares
d. Forgetting to pick up water and medicine packages
That is correct!
That is incorrect. Please try again.
You have completed your training. At this time, please message the experimenter through
GoogleTalk to let them know you are done. He or she will provide further instructions.
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Team Building Form
Instructions: Please answer the following questions about yourself. Do not speak with the other
participant as you make your selections.

Please choose the most appropriate answer choice
1. What is your gender?
a.

Male

b. Female

2. What is your current overall GPA?
_____________________________

3. What is your current education level?
a.

Freshman

b. Sophomore
c.

Junior

d. Senior

4. When do you anticipate graduating?
a.

By end of Summer 2015

b. Between Fall 2015 and Summer 2016
c.

Between Fall 2016 and Summer 2017

d. After Summer 2017

5. Have you received any awards for academic achievement?
a.

Yes

b. No

6. Are you currently employed or hold an internship position?
a.

Yes

b. No
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Instructions: Please choose five of the statements below which best represent what you do in
your spare time. Do not speak with the other participants as you make your selections.
______Plan a vacation with friends or family
______Write poetry or song lyrics
______Visit family members
______Call your friends
______Do gardening
______Download apps for your phone
______Draw or sketch
______Play a game on your computer
______Go outside and play a sport with others
______Use your phone to browse the internet
______Play games on your phone
______Read poetry or novels
______Listen to music and dance
______Text message people
______Walk or play with your pet outside
______Workout at home
______Have a dinner party
______Sing in a choir or band
______Go jogging
______Build or fix computers
______Call your parents or other family members
______Make arts and crafts
______Go out to eat with friends
______Go to a concert
______Clean your apartment or house
______Watch a sporting event with friends
______Play video games on a console
______Go hiking or camping
______Watch a play
______Go out with friends
______Browse through the internet on your computer
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______Play an instrument

Answer Sheet: Color Codes
______Plan a vacation with friends or family
______Write poetry or song lyrics
______Visit family members
______Call your friends
______Do gardening
______Download apps for your phone
______Draw or sketch
______Play a game on your computer
______Go outside and play a sport with others
______Use your phone to browse the internet
______Play games on your phone
______Read poetry or novels
______Listen to music and dance
______Text message people
______Walk or play with your pet outside
______Workout at home
______Have a dinner party
______Sing in a choir or band
______Go jogging
______Build or fix computers
______Call your parents or other family members
______Make arts and crafts
______Go out to eat with friends
______Go to a concert
______Clean your apartment or house
______Watch a sporting event with friends
______Play video games on a console
______Go hiking or camping
______Watch a play
______Go out with friends
______Browse through the internet on your computer
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______Play an instrument

Socially Oriented
(Green)

Artistically Oriented
(Yellow)

Actively Oriented
(Blue)

Blue Team
Member

Answer Sheet: Scoring
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Technology Oriented
(Red)

Team Building Response
Information About Your Teammate
Below is information provided by your teammate.
Gender: [Insert Participant Gender]
Current overall GPA: 3.65
Education level: Junior
Anticipated graduation: Between Fall 2015 and Summer 2016
Currently employed or holding an internship position: Yes

Similarity in Leisure Activities
Based on what you and your teammate indicated as activities you like to engage in, you are
BOTH: [Check the activity type to match that of the participant]
_____ Socially oriented
_____ Artistically oriented
_____ Actively oriented
_____ Technology oriented
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Scale
See below for each question. Note: ** indicates alternative, equivalent question asked for Spain
participants.

Items
1. What is your sex:
Male
Female
2. What is your age?
___________
3. What is your race or ethnic background? (check all that apply)**:
White/Caucasian, Anglo, European American; not Hispanic
Black/African American
Hispanic or Latino, including Mexican American, Central American
Asian or Asian American, including Chinese, Japanese
Pacific Islander or Native Hawaiian
American Indian
Alaskan Native
Middle Eastern, including Northern African, Arabic, West Asian, and others
Other: Please Describe___________________
4. If you chose more than one race or ethnic group in the previous question, which one do you
most identify with**?
White/Caucasian, Anglo, European American; not Hispanic
Black/African American
Hispanic or Latino, including Mexican American, Central American
Asian or Asian American, including Chinese, Japanese, and others
Pacific Islander or Native Hawaiian
American Indian
Alaskan Native
Middle Eastern, including Northern African, Arabic, West Asian, and others
Other: Please Describe_____________________
5. If you marked Middle Eastern in the previous question, which ethnic group are you a
descendant of? (Mark all that apply)
Arabs
Turks
Persians
Jews
Kurds
Aramean Syriacs
Armenians
Azeris
Circassians
Greeks
88

Georgians
Emiratis
Iranians
South Asians
Other: Please Describe___________________
6. What is your Mother’s race or ethnicity**?
White/Caucasian, Anglo, European American; not Hispanic
Black/African American
Hispanic or Latino, including Mexican American, Central American
Asian or Asian American, including Chinese, Japanese
Pacific Islander or Native Hawaiian
American Indian
Alaskan Native
Middle Eastern, including Northern African, Arabic, West Asian
Other: Please Describe______________
7. What is your father’s race or ethnicity**?
White/Caucasian, Anglo, European American; not Hispanic
Black/African American
Hispanic or Latino, including Mexican American, Central American
Asian or Asian American, including Chinese, Japanese
Pacific Islander or Native Hawaiian
American Indian
Alaskan Native
Middle Eastern, including Northern African, Arabic, West Asian
Other: Please Describe______________
8. Where were you born? (City, State; Country if outside the US)
__________________________
9. Is there a country other than the country in which you were born that you identify most
with?
____________________________
10. Where was your mother born? (City, State; Country if outside the US)
____________________________
11. Where was your father born? (City, State; Country if outside the US)
____________________________
12. Are you fluent in more than one language? If so, which languages, in order of most fluent
to least fluent?
______________________________________________________________
13. What language does your mother speak? If she speaks more than one language, list the
languages in order of most fluent to least fluent.
______________________________________________________________
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14. What language does your father speak? If he speaks more than one language, list the
languages in order of most fluent to least fluent.
______________________________________________________________
15. Marital Status:
Single
Married
Separated
Divorced
Widowed
Living with Another
Domestic Partnership
16. Class:
Freshman
Sophomore
Junior
Senior
If Senior – please indicate your year (i.e. 4th year, 5th year, etc.) ______________
17. How many credit hours are you enrolled in this semester? _________________
18. Major: _______________________
19. Minor: _______________________
20. Do you have any other degrees?
Yes
No
If Yes, please list them here: __________________________________
21. What is your employment status?
Not Employed
Self-Employed
Student
Employed Full-Time
Employed Part-Time
22. UCF GPA (or high school if you haven’t started classes): ___________
23. SAT Score**: ___________
Verbal**:___________
Math**: ___________
24. ACT Score**: ___________
25. Are you the first one in your immediate family to attend college? (Yes/No)
26. What is the highest education level of your mother?
High School
Some College
2-year College Degree
4-year College Degree
Some Graduate School
Master's Degree
Doctorate (including a Juris Doctorate – law degree)
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27. What is the highest education level of your father?
High School
Some College
2-year College Degree
4-year College Degree
Some Graduate School
Master's Degree
Doctorate (including a JD)
28. What is your employment status?
Not employed
Self-employed
Student
Employed Full-Time
Employed Part-Time
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Trust & Distrust

Wildman, J. L., Fiore, S. M., & Salas. E. (in progress). Development of trust and distrust
measures. Unpublished Working Draft. Institute for Simulation and Training, University of
Central Florida.

Scale

1 = Not at all  6 = Very much so

Items
To what extent do you feel:
1. Assured that the other team member will make intelligent decisions? (TC)
2. Confident that the other team member will try to do things that benefit the team? (TI)
3. Afraid that the other team member will purposefully do something that isn’t helpful? (DI)
4. Faith that the other team member can do the task at hand? (TC)
5. Suspicious about the other team member’s reasons behind certain decisions? (DI)
6. Convinced that you can rely on the other team member to try his/her hardest? (TI)
7. Confident in the other team member's ability to complete a task? (TC)
8. Nervous that the other team member will betray you? (DI)
9. Afraid that the other team member will make a mistake? (DC)
10. Confident that the other team member will do as they say? (TI)
11. Positive that the other team member will try and do what is best for the team? (TI)
12. Compelled to keep tabs on the other team member to be sure things get done? (DC)
13. Certain that the other team member will perform well? (TC)
14. Cautious about the other team member’s intentions for the team? (DI)
15. Paranoid that the other team member will fail? (DC)
16. Worried that the other team member will do something wrong? (DC)
Note: TC = Competence-based trust; TI = Intent-based trust; DC = Competence-based distrust;
DI = Intent-based distrust. Only TC and TI items utilized in the current study.
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